Yield and control in a supplier-customer relationship

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper considers the problem of yield production and the mutual sampling policies of a supplier and a customer. It is assumed that the parties do not cooperate and construct a random payoff game where, in addition to sampling, the supplier may choose a yield (a function of the production technology). Given binding contract parameters between the customer and the supplier, a solution of the game, which assumes risk neutrality, is shown to lead to two equilibria. These equilibria are discussed and contrasted with current approaches in the application of quality assurance inspection plans. Finally, yield optimization by the supplier in each of the equilibria will lead to the selection of a unique solution which will induce the customer not to sample at all or sample with a probability given in terms of the contract parameters of the problem.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1505-1515
Number of pages11
JournalInternational Journal of Production Research
Volume39
Issue number7
DOIs
StatePublished - May 10 2001

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Sampling
Quality assurance
Inspection
Suppliers
Supplier-customer relationships
Production technology
Risk neutrality

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering

Cite this

Yield and control in a supplier-customer relationship. / Tapiero, Charles.

In: International Journal of Production Research, Vol. 39, No. 7, 10.05.2001, p. 1505-1515.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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