Why we can't be bothered to read privacy policies models of privacy economics as a lemons market

Tony Vila, Rachel Greenstadt, David Molnar

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Abstract

    Consumers want to interact with web sites, but they also want to keep control of their private information. Asymmetric information about whether web sites will sell private information or not leads to a lemons market for privacy. We discuss privacy policies as signals in a lemons market and ways in which current realizations of privacy policies may fail to be effective signals. As a result of these shortcomings, we consider a "lemons market with testing," where consumers have a cost of determining whether a site meets their privacy requirement. Our model explains empirical data concerning privacy policies and privacy seals. We end by discussing cyclic instability in the number of web sites that sell consumer information.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationProceedings of the 5th International Conference on Electronic Commerce, ICEC '03
    Pages403-407
    Number of pages5
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Dec 1 2003
    Event5th International Conference on Electronic Commerce, ICEC '03 - Pittsburgh, PA, United States
    Duration: Sep 30 2003Oct 3 2003

    Publication series

    NameACM International Conference Proceeding Series
    Volume50

    Conference

    Conference5th International Conference on Electronic Commerce, ICEC '03
    CountryUnited States
    CityPittsburgh, PA
    Period9/30/0310/3/03

    Fingerprint

    Websites
    Economics
    Data privacy
    Seals
    Testing
    Costs

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Human-Computer Interaction
    • Computer Networks and Communications
    • Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
    • Software

    Cite this

    Vila, T., Greenstadt, R., & Molnar, D. (2003). Why we can't be bothered to read privacy policies models of privacy economics as a lemons market. In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Electronic Commerce, ICEC '03 (pp. 403-407). (ACM International Conference Proceeding Series; Vol. 50). https://doi.org/10.1145/948005.948057

    Why we can't be bothered to read privacy policies models of privacy economics as a lemons market. / Vila, Tony; Greenstadt, Rachel; Molnar, David.

    Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Electronic Commerce, ICEC '03. 2003. p. 403-407 (ACM International Conference Proceeding Series; Vol. 50).

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Vila, T, Greenstadt, R & Molnar, D 2003, Why we can't be bothered to read privacy policies models of privacy economics as a lemons market. in Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Electronic Commerce, ICEC '03. ACM International Conference Proceeding Series, vol. 50, pp. 403-407, 5th International Conference on Electronic Commerce, ICEC '03, Pittsburgh, PA, United States, 9/30/03. https://doi.org/10.1145/948005.948057
    Vila T, Greenstadt R, Molnar D. Why we can't be bothered to read privacy policies models of privacy economics as a lemons market. In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Electronic Commerce, ICEC '03. 2003. p. 403-407. (ACM International Conference Proceeding Series). https://doi.org/10.1145/948005.948057
    Vila, Tony ; Greenstadt, Rachel ; Molnar, David. / Why we can't be bothered to read privacy policies models of privacy economics as a lemons market. Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Electronic Commerce, ICEC '03. 2003. pp. 403-407 (ACM International Conference Proceeding Series).
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