Why We Can't be Bothered to Read Privacy Policies Models of Privacy Economics as a Lemons Market

Tony Vila, Rachel Greenstadt, David Molnar

    Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

    Abstract

    Consumers want to interact with web sites, but they also want to keep control of their private information. Asymmetric information about whether web sites will sell private information or not leads to a lemons market for privacy. We discuss privacy policies as signals in a lemons market and ways in which current realizations of privacy policies may fail to be effective signals. As a result of these shortcomings, we consider a "lemons market with testing," where consumers have a cost of determining whether a site meets their privacy requirement. Our model explains empirical data concerning privacy policies and privacy seals. We end by discussing cyclic instability in the number of web sites that sell consumer information.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages404-408
    Number of pages5
    StatePublished - Dec 1 2003
    EventFifth International Conference on Electric Commerce, ICEC 2003 - Pittsburgh, PA, United States
    Duration: Sep 30 2003Oct 3 2003

    Conference

    ConferenceFifth International Conference on Electric Commerce, ICEC 2003
    CountryUnited States
    CityPittsburgh, PA
    Period9/30/0310/3/03

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    Websites
    Economics
    Data privacy
    Seals
    Testing
    Costs

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Software
    • Computer Science Applications
    • Computer Networks and Communications

    Cite this

    Vila, T., Greenstadt, R., & Molnar, D. (2003). Why We Can't be Bothered to Read Privacy Policies Models of Privacy Economics as a Lemons Market. 404-408. Paper presented at Fifth International Conference on Electric Commerce, ICEC 2003, Pittsburgh, PA, United States.

    Why We Can't be Bothered to Read Privacy Policies Models of Privacy Economics as a Lemons Market. / Vila, Tony; Greenstadt, Rachel; Molnar, David.

    2003. 404-408 Paper presented at Fifth International Conference on Electric Commerce, ICEC 2003, Pittsburgh, PA, United States.

    Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

    Vila, T, Greenstadt, R & Molnar, D 2003, 'Why We Can't be Bothered to Read Privacy Policies Models of Privacy Economics as a Lemons Market', Paper presented at Fifth International Conference on Electric Commerce, ICEC 2003, Pittsburgh, PA, United States, 9/30/03 - 10/3/03 pp. 404-408.
    Vila T, Greenstadt R, Molnar D. Why We Can't be Bothered to Read Privacy Policies Models of Privacy Economics as a Lemons Market. 2003. Paper presented at Fifth International Conference on Electric Commerce, ICEC 2003, Pittsburgh, PA, United States.
    Vila, Tony ; Greenstadt, Rachel ; Molnar, David. / Why We Can't be Bothered to Read Privacy Policies Models of Privacy Economics as a Lemons Market. Paper presented at Fifth International Conference on Electric Commerce, ICEC 2003, Pittsburgh, PA, United States.5 p.
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