Why the West Became Wild

Informal Governance with Incomplete Networks

Jennifer M. Larson

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Settlers flocking to boomtowns on the American western frontier were faced with the same task that communities in weak states across the globe face in contemporary times: self-governance. Peer sanctions can enforce cooperation in these environments, but their efficacy depends on the social networks that transmit information from peer to peer. The author uses a game-theoretic model to show that peripheral network positions can generate such strong incentives to misbehave that persistent cheating occurs in equilibrium. The model reveals that groups maintaining high levels of cooperation that face shocks to their strategic environment or to their network can ratchet down into less cooperative equilibria in which the most peripheral become ostracized. Furthermore, population change that features rapid growth, high turnover, and enclave settlements can undermine cooperation. The insights from this article help to explain the trajectory of cooperation in the mining towns of the Wild West in which high levels of cooperation deteriorated as the population surged, and help to make sense of why only certain nonwhite settlers were targets of hostility and racism.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)713-749
    Number of pages37
    JournalWorld Politics
    Volume69
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Oct 1 2017

    Fingerprint

    governance
    turnover
    sanction
    racism
    social network
    town
    incentive
    community
    Group

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations

    Cite this

    Why the West Became Wild : Informal Governance with Incomplete Networks. / Larson, Jennifer M.

    In: World Politics, Vol. 69, No. 4, 01.10.2017, p. 713-749.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Larson, Jennifer M. / Why the West Became Wild : Informal Governance with Incomplete Networks. In: World Politics. 2017 ; Vol. 69, No. 4. pp. 713-749.
    @article{bf173dcc78a748e782b095961d3db916,
    title = "Why the West Became Wild: Informal Governance with Incomplete Networks",
    abstract = "Settlers flocking to boomtowns on the American western frontier were faced with the same task that communities in weak states across the globe face in contemporary times: self-governance. Peer sanctions can enforce cooperation in these environments, but their efficacy depends on the social networks that transmit information from peer to peer. The author uses a game-theoretic model to show that peripheral network positions can generate such strong incentives to misbehave that persistent cheating occurs in equilibrium. The model reveals that groups maintaining high levels of cooperation that face shocks to their strategic environment or to their network can ratchet down into less cooperative equilibria in which the most peripheral become ostracized. Furthermore, population change that features rapid growth, high turnover, and enclave settlements can undermine cooperation. The insights from this article help to explain the trajectory of cooperation in the mining towns of the Wild West in which high levels of cooperation deteriorated as the population surged, and help to make sense of why only certain nonwhite settlers were targets of hostility and racism.",
    author = "Larson, {Jennifer M.}",
    year = "2017",
    month = "10",
    day = "1",
    doi = "10.1017/S0043887117000181",
    language = "English (US)",
    volume = "69",
    pages = "713--749",
    journal = "World Politics",
    issn = "0043-8871",
    publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
    number = "4",

    }

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Why the West Became Wild

    T2 - Informal Governance with Incomplete Networks

    AU - Larson, Jennifer M.

    PY - 2017/10/1

    Y1 - 2017/10/1

    N2 - Settlers flocking to boomtowns on the American western frontier were faced with the same task that communities in weak states across the globe face in contemporary times: self-governance. Peer sanctions can enforce cooperation in these environments, but their efficacy depends on the social networks that transmit information from peer to peer. The author uses a game-theoretic model to show that peripheral network positions can generate such strong incentives to misbehave that persistent cheating occurs in equilibrium. The model reveals that groups maintaining high levels of cooperation that face shocks to their strategic environment or to their network can ratchet down into less cooperative equilibria in which the most peripheral become ostracized. Furthermore, population change that features rapid growth, high turnover, and enclave settlements can undermine cooperation. The insights from this article help to explain the trajectory of cooperation in the mining towns of the Wild West in which high levels of cooperation deteriorated as the population surged, and help to make sense of why only certain nonwhite settlers were targets of hostility and racism.

    AB - Settlers flocking to boomtowns on the American western frontier were faced with the same task that communities in weak states across the globe face in contemporary times: self-governance. Peer sanctions can enforce cooperation in these environments, but their efficacy depends on the social networks that transmit information from peer to peer. The author uses a game-theoretic model to show that peripheral network positions can generate such strong incentives to misbehave that persistent cheating occurs in equilibrium. The model reveals that groups maintaining high levels of cooperation that face shocks to their strategic environment or to their network can ratchet down into less cooperative equilibria in which the most peripheral become ostracized. Furthermore, population change that features rapid growth, high turnover, and enclave settlements can undermine cooperation. The insights from this article help to explain the trajectory of cooperation in the mining towns of the Wild West in which high levels of cooperation deteriorated as the population surged, and help to make sense of why only certain nonwhite settlers were targets of hostility and racism.

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85029917377&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85029917377&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1017/S0043887117000181

    DO - 10.1017/S0043887117000181

    M3 - Article

    VL - 69

    SP - 713

    EP - 749

    JO - World Politics

    JF - World Politics

    SN - 0043-8871

    IS - 4

    ER -