Why moral psychology is disturbing

Regina A. Rini

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Learning the psychological origins of our moral judgments can lead us to lose confidence in them. In this paper I explain why. I consider two explanations drawn from existing literature—regarding epistemic unreliability and automaticity—and argue that neither is fully adequate. I then propose a new explanation, according to which psychological research reveals the extent to which we are disturbingly disunified as moral agents.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-20
Number of pages20
JournalPhilosophical Studies
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Aug 23 2016

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Psychological
Confidence
Psychological Research
Moral Agents
Moral Judgment
Moral Psychology

Keywords

  • Doxastic embarrassment
  • Moral intuition
  • Moral judgment
  • Moral psychology

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Why moral psychology is disturbing. / Rini, Regina A.

In: Philosophical Studies, 23.08.2016, p. 1-20.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Rini, Regina A. / Why moral psychology is disturbing. In: Philosophical Studies. 2016 ; pp. 1-20.
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