Why moral psychology is disturbing

Regina A. Rini

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Learning the psychological origins of our moral judgments can lead us to lose confidence in them. In this paper I explain why. I consider two explanations drawn from existing literature—regarding epistemic unreliability and automaticity—and argue that neither is fully adequate. I then propose a new explanation, according to which psychological research reveals the extent to which we are disturbingly disunified as moral agents.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1439-1458
Number of pages20
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume174
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2017

    Fingerprint

Keywords

  • Doxastic embarrassment
  • Moral intuition
  • Moral judgment
  • Moral psychology

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this