Why do school district budget referenda fail?

Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Randy A. Ehrenberg, Christopher L. Smith, Liang Zhang

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

Abstract

Our article analyzes historical data for New York State on the percentage of school board budget proposals that are defeated each year and panel data that we have collected on budget vote success for individual school districts in the state. We find that changes in state aid have little impact on budget vote success. Defeating a budget in one year increases the likelihood that voters will defeat a budget the next year. Finally, districts have a lower probability of having their budget proposals defeated when their school board members have longer terms.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article numberWorking paper #9088
JournalWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research)
StatePublished - 2004

Fingerprint

referendum
budget
district
school
voter

Keywords

  • Budget referenda
  • School district finance

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Education

Cite this

Ehrenberg, R. G., Ehrenberg, R. A., Smith, C. L., & Zhang, L. (2004). Why do school district budget referenda fail? Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), [Working paper #9088].

Why do school district budget referenda fail? / Ehrenberg, Ronald G.; Ehrenberg, Randy A.; Smith, Christopher L.; Zhang, Liang.

In: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), 2004.

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

Ehrenberg, Ronald G. ; Ehrenberg, Randy A. ; Smith, Christopher L. ; Zhang, Liang. / Why do school district budget referenda fail?. In: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research). 2004.
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