Why democracies cooperate more: Electoral control and international trade agreements

Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, Bryan Rosendorff

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

    Abstract

    Over the past fifty years, barriers to international trade have decreased substantially. A key source of this decline in protectionism has been the proliferation of agreements among countries to liberalize commerce. In this article, we analyze the domestic political conditions under which states have concluded such agreements and more generally, explore the factors affecting interstate economic cooperation. We argue that interstate cooperation on commercial issues depends heavily on the political regime types of participants: as states become more democratic, they are increasingly likely to conclude trade agreements. To test our claim, we examine whether the regime types of states have influenced their propensity to form and expand preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) during the period since World War II. We find that democratic countries are about twice as likely to form a PTA as autocratic countries, and that pairs of democracies are roughly four times as likely to do so as autocratic pairs. These results provide strong evidence that democracies are more commercially cooperative than less democratic countries.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    JournalInternational Organization
    Volume56
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jun 2002

    Fingerprint

    world trade
    democracy
    economic cooperation
    protectionism
    political regime
    commerce
    World War II
    proliferation
    regime
    evidence
    Trade agreements
    International trade
    Democracy
    Political regime
    Commerce
    Factors
    Protectionism
    Economic cooperation
    Propensity
    Proliferation

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations
    • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
    • Law

    Cite this

    Why democracies cooperate more : Electoral control and international trade agreements. / Mansfield, Edward D.; Milner, Helen V.; Rosendorff, Bryan.

    In: International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 3, 06.2002.

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

    Mansfield, Edward D. ; Milner, Helen V. ; Rosendorff, Bryan. / Why democracies cooperate more : Electoral control and international trade agreements. In: International Organization. 2002 ; Vol. 56, No. 3.
    @article{a6e5512e1460435dac9fd233fe2710f5,
    title = "Why democracies cooperate more: Electoral control and international trade agreements",
    abstract = "Over the past fifty years, barriers to international trade have decreased substantially. A key source of this decline in protectionism has been the proliferation of agreements among countries to liberalize commerce. In this article, we analyze the domestic political conditions under which states have concluded such agreements and more generally, explore the factors affecting interstate economic cooperation. We argue that interstate cooperation on commercial issues depends heavily on the political regime types of participants: as states become more democratic, they are increasingly likely to conclude trade agreements. To test our claim, we examine whether the regime types of states have influenced their propensity to form and expand preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) during the period since World War II. We find that democratic countries are about twice as likely to form a PTA as autocratic countries, and that pairs of democracies are roughly four times as likely to do so as autocratic pairs. These results provide strong evidence that democracies are more commercially cooperative than less democratic countries.",
    author = "Mansfield, {Edward D.} and Milner, {Helen V.} and Bryan Rosendorff",
    year = "2002",
    month = "6",
    doi = "10.1162/002081802760199863",
    language = "English (US)",
    volume = "56",
    journal = "International Organization",
    issn = "0020-8183",
    publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
    number = "3",

    }

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Why democracies cooperate more

    T2 - Electoral control and international trade agreements

    AU - Mansfield, Edward D.

    AU - Milner, Helen V.

    AU - Rosendorff, Bryan

    PY - 2002/6

    Y1 - 2002/6

    N2 - Over the past fifty years, barriers to international trade have decreased substantially. A key source of this decline in protectionism has been the proliferation of agreements among countries to liberalize commerce. In this article, we analyze the domestic political conditions under which states have concluded such agreements and more generally, explore the factors affecting interstate economic cooperation. We argue that interstate cooperation on commercial issues depends heavily on the political regime types of participants: as states become more democratic, they are increasingly likely to conclude trade agreements. To test our claim, we examine whether the regime types of states have influenced their propensity to form and expand preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) during the period since World War II. We find that democratic countries are about twice as likely to form a PTA as autocratic countries, and that pairs of democracies are roughly four times as likely to do so as autocratic pairs. These results provide strong evidence that democracies are more commercially cooperative than less democratic countries.

    AB - Over the past fifty years, barriers to international trade have decreased substantially. A key source of this decline in protectionism has been the proliferation of agreements among countries to liberalize commerce. In this article, we analyze the domestic political conditions under which states have concluded such agreements and more generally, explore the factors affecting interstate economic cooperation. We argue that interstate cooperation on commercial issues depends heavily on the political regime types of participants: as states become more democratic, they are increasingly likely to conclude trade agreements. To test our claim, we examine whether the regime types of states have influenced their propensity to form and expand preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) during the period since World War II. We find that democratic countries are about twice as likely to form a PTA as autocratic countries, and that pairs of democracies are roughly four times as likely to do so as autocratic pairs. These results provide strong evidence that democracies are more commercially cooperative than less democratic countries.

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=18744379723&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=18744379723&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1162/002081802760199863

    DO - 10.1162/002081802760199863

    M3 - Review article

    AN - SCOPUS:18744379723

    VL - 56

    JO - International Organization

    JF - International Organization

    SN - 0020-8183

    IS - 3

    ER -