Who pays for government? descriptive representationb and exploitative revenue sources

Michael W. Sances, Hye Young You

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We examine US city governments' use of fines and court fees for local revenue, a policy that disproportionately affects black voters, and the connections between this policy and black representation. Using data on over 9,000 cities, we show that the use of fines as revenue is common and that it is robustly related to the share of city residents who are black. We also find that black representation on city councils diminishes the connection between black population and fines revenue. Our findings speak to the potential of descriptive representation to alleviate biases in city policy.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1090-1094
    Number of pages5
    JournalJournal of Politics
    Volume79
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jul 1 2017

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    Who pays for government? descriptive representationb and exploitative revenue sources. / Sances, Michael W.; You, Hye Young.

    In: Journal of Politics, Vol. 79, No. 3, 01.07.2017, p. 1090-1094.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Sances, Michael W. ; You, Hye Young. / Who pays for government? descriptive representationb and exploitative revenue sources. In: Journal of Politics. 2017 ; Vol. 79, No. 3. pp. 1090-1094.
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