When are monetary commitments credible? Parallel agreements and the sustainability of currency unions

David Stasavage, Dominique Guillaume

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This article investigates the conditions which make it costly for governments to renege on institutional commitments governing monetary policy. Focusing on one such type of commitment - monetary integration - we develop and test a hypothesis which suggests that the presence of parallel international agreements plays an important role in raising the costs of exit for states which might otherwise withdraw from a monetary union. While existing political economy work on credible commitments in the area of monetary policy has had a heavy focus on countries in the European Union, we broaden the inquiry, using quantitative and qualitative evidence from the numerous African countries which have participated in monetary unions over the last forty years. Our results provide strong support for the parallel agreements hypothesis.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)119-146
Number of pages28
JournalBritish Journal of Political Science
Volume32
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2002

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currency
monetary union
sustainability
commitment
monetary policy
international agreement
political economy
costs
evidence

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

When are monetary commitments credible? Parallel agreements and the sustainability of currency unions. / Stasavage, David; Guillaume, Dominique.

In: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2002, p. 119-146.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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