What have we learned from social learning?

Douglas Gale

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Models of herd behavior and informational cascades often make strong assumptions about the information available to agents, the nature of the choices being made, the timing of decisions, and the symmetry of equilibrium. This note considers the robustness of some results from the literature on social learning and argues that the inefficiency of equilibrium in the presence of informational externalities and strategic delay may be the most important lesson of all.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)617-628
    Number of pages12
    JournalEuropean Economic Review
    Volume40
    Issue number3-5
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Apr 1996

      Fingerprint

    Keywords

    • Cascades
    • Delay
    • Information
    • Learning

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this