What have we learned from social learning?

Douglas Gale

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Models of herd behavior and informational cascades often make strong assumptions about the information available to agents, the nature of the choices being made, the timing of decisions, and the symmetry of equilibrium. This note considers the robustness of some results from the literature on social learning and argues that the inefficiency of equilibrium in the presence of informational externalities and strategic delay may be the most important lesson of all.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)617-628
    Number of pages12
    JournalEuropean Economic Review
    Volume40
    Issue number3-5
    StatePublished - Apr 1996

    Fingerprint

    Social learning
    Informational cascades
    Externalities
    Robustness
    Symmetry
    Inefficiency
    Herd behavior

    Keywords

    • Cascades
    • Delay
    • Information
    • Learning

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Finance

    Cite this

    What have we learned from social learning? / Gale, Douglas.

    In: European Economic Review, Vol. 40, No. 3-5, 04.1996, p. 617-628.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Gale, D 1996, 'What have we learned from social learning?', European Economic Review, vol. 40, no. 3-5, pp. 617-628.
    Gale, Douglas. / What have we learned from social learning?. In: European Economic Review. 1996 ; Vol. 40, No. 3-5. pp. 617-628.
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