Well Founding Grounding Grounding

Gabriel Rabin, Brian Rabern

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Those who wish to claim that all facts about grounding are themselves grounded (“the meta-grounding thesis”) must defend against the charge that such a claim leads to infinite regress and violates the well-foundedness of ground. In this paper, we defend. First, we explore three distinct but related notions of “well-founded”, which are often conflated, and three corresponding notions of infinite regress. We explore the entailment relations between these notions. We conclude that the meta-grounding thesis need not lead to tension with any of the three notions of “well-founded”. Finally, we explore the details of and motivations for further conditions on ground that one might add to generate a conflict between the meta-grounding thesis and a well-founded constraint. We explore these topics by developing and utilizing a formal framework based on the notion of a grounding structure.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)349-379
    Number of pages31
    JournalJournal of Philosophical Logic
    Volume45
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Aug 1 2016

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    Grounding
    Founding
    Infinite Regress
    Wishes
    Entailment

    Keywords

    • Foundationalism
    • Ground
    • Grounding grounding
    • Infinite regress
    • Metaphysical dependence
    • Well-founded

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Philosophy

    Cite this

    Well Founding Grounding Grounding. / Rabin, Gabriel; Rabern, Brian.

    In: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 45, No. 4, 01.08.2016, p. 349-379.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Rabin, Gabriel ; Rabern, Brian. / Well Founding Grounding Grounding. In: Journal of Philosophical Logic. 2016 ; Vol. 45, No. 4. pp. 349-379.
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