Well Founding Grounding Grounding

Gabriel Rabin, Brian Rabern

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Those who wish to claim that all facts about grounding are themselves grounded (“the meta-grounding thesis”) must defend against the charge that such a claim leads to infinite regress and violates the well-foundedness of ground. In this paper, we defend. First, we explore three distinct but related notions of “well-founded”, which are often conflated, and three corresponding notions of infinite regress. We explore the entailment relations between these notions. We conclude that the meta-grounding thesis need not lead to tension with any of the three notions of “well-founded”. Finally, we explore the details of and motivations for further conditions on ground that one might add to generate a conflict between the meta-grounding thesis and a well-founded constraint. We explore these topics by developing and utilizing a formal framework based on the notion of a grounding structure.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)349-379
Number of pages31
JournalJournal of Philosophical Logic
Volume45
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1 2016

Fingerprint

Grounding
Founding
Infinite Regress
Wishes
Entailment

Keywords

  • Foundationalism
  • Ground
  • Grounding grounding
  • Infinite regress
  • Metaphysical dependence
  • Well-founded

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Well Founding Grounding Grounding. / Rabin, Gabriel; Rabern, Brian.

In: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 45, No. 4, 01.08.2016, p. 349-379.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Rabin, Gabriel ; Rabern, Brian. / Well Founding Grounding Grounding. In: Journal of Philosophical Logic. 2016 ; Vol. 45, No. 4. pp. 349-379.
@article{768f68c527004ea29fd095ad72ed22b3,
title = "Well Founding Grounding Grounding",
abstract = "Those who wish to claim that all facts about grounding are themselves grounded (“the meta-grounding thesis”) must defend against the charge that such a claim leads to infinite regress and violates the well-foundedness of ground. In this paper, we defend. First, we explore three distinct but related notions of “well-founded”, which are often conflated, and three corresponding notions of infinite regress. We explore the entailment relations between these notions. We conclude that the meta-grounding thesis need not lead to tension with any of the three notions of “well-founded”. Finally, we explore the details of and motivations for further conditions on ground that one might add to generate a conflict between the meta-grounding thesis and a well-founded constraint. We explore these topics by developing and utilizing a formal framework based on the notion of a grounding structure.",
keywords = "Foundationalism, Ground, Grounding grounding, Infinite regress, Metaphysical dependence, Well-founded",
author = "Gabriel Rabin and Brian Rabern",
year = "2016",
month = "8",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s10992-015-9376-4",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "45",
pages = "349--379",
journal = "Journal of Philosophical Logic",
issn = "0022-3611",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Well Founding Grounding Grounding

AU - Rabin, Gabriel

AU - Rabern, Brian

PY - 2016/8/1

Y1 - 2016/8/1

N2 - Those who wish to claim that all facts about grounding are themselves grounded (“the meta-grounding thesis”) must defend against the charge that such a claim leads to infinite regress and violates the well-foundedness of ground. In this paper, we defend. First, we explore three distinct but related notions of “well-founded”, which are often conflated, and three corresponding notions of infinite regress. We explore the entailment relations between these notions. We conclude that the meta-grounding thesis need not lead to tension with any of the three notions of “well-founded”. Finally, we explore the details of and motivations for further conditions on ground that one might add to generate a conflict between the meta-grounding thesis and a well-founded constraint. We explore these topics by developing and utilizing a formal framework based on the notion of a grounding structure.

AB - Those who wish to claim that all facts about grounding are themselves grounded (“the meta-grounding thesis”) must defend against the charge that such a claim leads to infinite regress and violates the well-foundedness of ground. In this paper, we defend. First, we explore three distinct but related notions of “well-founded”, which are often conflated, and three corresponding notions of infinite regress. We explore the entailment relations between these notions. We conclude that the meta-grounding thesis need not lead to tension with any of the three notions of “well-founded”. Finally, we explore the details of and motivations for further conditions on ground that one might add to generate a conflict between the meta-grounding thesis and a well-founded constraint. We explore these topics by developing and utilizing a formal framework based on the notion of a grounding structure.

KW - Foundationalism

KW - Ground

KW - Grounding grounding

KW - Infinite regress

KW - Metaphysical dependence

KW - Well-founded

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84978176790&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84978176790&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s10992-015-9376-4

DO - 10.1007/s10992-015-9376-4

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84978176790

VL - 45

SP - 349

EP - 379

JO - Journal of Philosophical Logic

JF - Journal of Philosophical Logic

SN - 0022-3611

IS - 4

ER -