Weighted majoritarian rules for the location of multiple public facilities

Olivier Bochet, Sidartha Gordon, Rene Saran

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We consider collective decision problems given by a profile of single-peaked preferences defined over the real line and a set of pure public facilities to be located on the line. In this context, Bochet and Gordon (2012) provide a large class of priority rules based on efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each such rule is described by a fixed priority ordering among interest groups. We show that any priority rule which treats agents symmetrically - anonymity - respects some form of coherence across collective decision problems - reinforcement - and only depends on peak information - peak-only - is a weighted majoritarian rule. Each such rule defines priorities based on the relative size of the interest groups and specific weights attached to locations. We give an explicit account of the richness of this class of rules.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)454-459
Number of pages6
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume49
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2013

Fingerprint

Density (specific gravity)
Reinforcement
Priority Rules
Decision problem
Anonymity
Real Line
Monotonicity
Priority rules
Line
Interest groups
Class
Single-peaked preferences
Rule-based
Population monotonicity
Sovereignty

Keywords

  • Anonymity
  • Object-population monotonicity
  • Priority rules
  • Reinforcement
  • Sovereignty
  • Weighted majoritarian rules

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

Weighted majoritarian rules for the location of multiple public facilities. / Bochet, Olivier; Gordon, Sidartha; Saran, Rene.

In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 49, No. 6, 01.12.2013, p. 454-459.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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