War and the survival of political leaders

A comparative study of regime types and political accountability

Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We seek to answer the question, What effect does international war participation have on the ability of political leaders to survive in office? We develop a model of political reliability and derive seven related hypotheses from it that anticipate variation in the time a national political leader will survive in office after the onset of a war. Drawing upon a broadly based data set on state involvement in international war between 1816 and 1975, our expectations are tested through censored Weibull regression. Four of the hypotheses are tested, and all are supported by the analysis. We find that those leaders who engage their nation in war subject themselves to a domestic political hazard that threatens the very essence of the office-holding homo politicus, the retention of political power. The hazard is mitigated by longstanding experience for authoritarian elites, an effect that is muted for democratic leaders, while the hazard is militated by defeat and high costs from war for all types of leaders. Additionally, we find that authoritarian leaders are inclined to war longer after they come to power than democratic leaders. Further, democratic leaders select wars with a lower risk of defeat than do their authoritarian counterparts.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)841-855
    Number of pages15
    JournalAmerican Political Science Review
    Volume89
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 1995

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    regime
    leader
    responsibility
    political power
    elite
    regression
    participation
    ability
    costs
    experience

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    War and the survival of political leaders : A comparative study of regime types and political accountability. / Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce; Siverson, Randolph M.

    In: American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 4, 1995, p. 841-855.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce ; Siverson, Randolph M. / War and the survival of political leaders : A comparative study of regime types and political accountability. In: American Political Science Review. 1995 ; Vol. 89, No. 4. pp. 841-855.
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