Walrasian equilibrium in matching models

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We analyze trading in a model in which the agents and their preferences are the same as in the main models of matching and bargaining, but in which trade is centralized rather than decentralized. We characterize equilibrium when trade is centralized and, by comparing our results with results from the matching literature, we show conditions under which decentralized trading processes reproduce the allocations of our centralized one. We establish that the competitive price as defined in the matching literature (i.e., relative to the stocks, flows, or totals) coincides, in the appropriate setting, with the equilibrium price in our model.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)245-259
Number of pages15
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume35
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 1998

Fingerprint

Walrasian Equilibrium
Model Matching
Decentralized
Bargaining
Model
Matching model
Walrasian equilibrium
Trade
literature

Keywords

  • Bargaining
  • C78
  • D50
  • Matching
  • Walrasian equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Psychology(all)
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Cite this

Walrasian equilibrium in matching models. / Wooders, John.

In: Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 35, No. 3, 01.05.1998, p. 245-259.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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