Wages and involuntary unemployment in the slack season of a village economy

Anindata Mukherjee, Debraj Ray

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We model slack season wages in a village economy, in the presence of involuntary unemployment. Our model draws its inspiration from sociological notions of 'everyday peasant resistance'. In particular, labourers can react to employers who pay low slack wages by refusing to work for them in the relatively tight peak season. Such refusals, however, are not automatic and are modelled endogenously. A continuum of equilibrium wage configurations is obtained. These configurations, barring one, involve wages exceeding reservation wages, despite the presence of involuntary unemployment. Several qualitative observations follow. These are examined with respect to available empirical data, in particular, the village survey of Palanpur.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)227-264
    Number of pages38
    JournalJournal of Development Economics
    Volume37
    Issue number1-2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 1991

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    unemployment
    wage
    village
    economy
    low wage
    peasant
    employer
    Wages
    Involuntary unemployment

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Wages and involuntary unemployment in the slack season of a village economy. / Mukherjee, Anindata; Ray, Debraj.

    In: Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 37, No. 1-2, 1991, p. 227-264.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Mukherjee, Anindata ; Ray, Debraj. / Wages and involuntary unemployment in the slack season of a village economy. In: Journal of Development Economics. 1991 ; Vol. 37, No. 1-2. pp. 227-264.
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