Voter strategies with restricted choice menus

Kenneth Benoit, Daniela Giannetti, Michael Laver

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

    Abstract

    Mixed-member electoral systems require voters simultaneously to cast ballots in single-member districts (SMD) and multimember, proportional representation (PR) constituencies. It may be that not all parties offer candidates in both electoral contexts, however. In this event would-be voters for some parties may find themselves 'frustrated' by the restricted choice menu on offer in the SMD, being effectively forced to split their vote between different parties. Here we explore the different behaviours of frustrated voters in the 1996 mixed-member election to Italy's Chamber of Deputies, characterizing these as being either in some sense non-strategic (concerned above all with the relative policy platforms of candidates) or strategic (concerned above all to influence the eventual composition of government). Using an extended method for ecological inference, we parameterize and estimate rates of different types of ticket-splitting at the district level, and link the degree of what we characterize as strategic voting to the relative policy distance between the respective local representatives of the Italian pre-electoral coalitions.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)459-485
    Number of pages27
    JournalBritish Journal of Political Science
    Volume36
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jul 2006

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    voter
    district
    candidacy
    proportional representation
    electoral system
    chamber
    voting
    coalition
    Italy
    election
    event

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Voter strategies with restricted choice menus. / Benoit, Kenneth; Giannetti, Daniela; Laver, Michael.

    In: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 36, No. 3, 07.2006, p. 459-485.

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

    Benoit, Kenneth ; Giannetti, Daniela ; Laver, Michael. / Voter strategies with restricted choice menus. In: British Journal of Political Science. 2006 ; Vol. 36, No. 3. pp. 459-485.
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