V - Science, knowledge, and animal minds

Dale Jamieson

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    In recent years both philosophers and scientists have been sceptical about the existence of animal minds. This is in distinction to Hume who claimed that '...no truth appears to me more evident, than that beasts are endow'd with thought and reason as well as men'. I argue that Hume is correct about the epistemological salience of our ordinary practices of ascribing mental states to animals. The reluctance of contemporary philosophers and scientists to embrace the view that animals have minds is primarily a fact about their philosophy and science rather than a fact about animals. The recognition of this fact is the beginning of any serious effort to develop a science of cognitive ethology.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)79-102
    Number of pages24
    JournalProceedings of the Aristotelean Society
    Volume98
    Issue number1
    StatePublished - 1998

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    Animal Mind
    Animals
    Philosopher
    Beast
    Epistemological
    Cognitive Ethology
    Mental State
    Thought
    Philosophy

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Philosophy

    Cite this

    V - Science, knowledge, and animal minds. / Jamieson, Dale.

    In: Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, Vol. 98, No. 1, 1998, p. 79-102.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Jamieson, Dale. / V - Science, knowledge, and animal minds. In: Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society. 1998 ; Vol. 98, No. 1. pp. 79-102.
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