Uniqueness and Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions with a Reserve Price

Alessandro Lizzeri, Nicola Persico

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for a general class of two-player bidding games. We apply our results to the first price auction, the combination of first and second price auctions, the war of attrition, the all pay auction, as well as combinations of the latter two auction forms. We also treat the first price auction without risk neutrality. Our results deal with the asymmetric, affiliated common values environment. In the case where signals are independent our results apply to all equilibria. When signals are not independent, our uniqueness results hold in the class of nondecreasing strategy equilibria. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D44.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)83-114
    Number of pages32
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume30
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 2000

    Fingerprint

    First-price auction
    Reserve price
    Uniqueness
    Auctions
    Existence of equilibrium
    All-pay auction
    War of attrition
    Risk neutrality
    Common values
    Economics
    Second-price auction
    Bidding

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Finance

    Cite this

    Uniqueness and Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions with a Reserve Price. / Lizzeri, Alessandro; Persico, Nicola.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 30, No. 1, 01.2000, p. 83-114.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Lizzeri, Alessandro ; Persico, Nicola. / Uniqueness and Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions with a Reserve Price. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2000 ; Vol. 30, No. 1. pp. 83-114.
    @article{fdc69cf0b7904c2f9adeee37c2da2081,
    title = "Uniqueness and Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions with a Reserve Price",
    abstract = "We prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for a general class of two-player bidding games. We apply our results to the first price auction, the combination of first and second price auctions, the war of attrition, the all pay auction, as well as combinations of the latter two auction forms. We also treat the first price auction without risk neutrality. Our results deal with the asymmetric, affiliated common values environment. In the case where signals are independent our results apply to all equilibria. When signals are not independent, our uniqueness results hold in the class of nondecreasing strategy equilibria. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D44.",
    author = "Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola Persico",
    year = "2000",
    month = "1",
    doi = "10.1006/game.1998.0704",
    language = "English (US)",
    volume = "30",
    pages = "83--114",
    journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
    issn = "0899-8256",
    publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
    number = "1",

    }

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Uniqueness and Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions with a Reserve Price

    AU - Lizzeri, Alessandro

    AU - Persico, Nicola

    PY - 2000/1

    Y1 - 2000/1

    N2 - We prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for a general class of two-player bidding games. We apply our results to the first price auction, the combination of first and second price auctions, the war of attrition, the all pay auction, as well as combinations of the latter two auction forms. We also treat the first price auction without risk neutrality. Our results deal with the asymmetric, affiliated common values environment. In the case where signals are independent our results apply to all equilibria. When signals are not independent, our uniqueness results hold in the class of nondecreasing strategy equilibria. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D44.

    AB - We prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for a general class of two-player bidding games. We apply our results to the first price auction, the combination of first and second price auctions, the war of attrition, the all pay auction, as well as combinations of the latter two auction forms. We also treat the first price auction without risk neutrality. Our results deal with the asymmetric, affiliated common values environment. In the case where signals are independent our results apply to all equilibria. When signals are not independent, our uniqueness results hold in the class of nondecreasing strategy equilibria. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D44.

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0002053556&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0002053556&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1006/game.1998.0704

    DO - 10.1006/game.1998.0704

    M3 - Article

    AN - SCOPUS:0002053556

    VL - 30

    SP - 83

    EP - 114

    JO - Games and Economic Behavior

    JF - Games and Economic Behavior

    SN - 0899-8256

    IS - 1

    ER -