Two-sided matching with interdependent values

Archishman Chakraborty, Alessandro Citanna, Michael Ostrovsky

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We introduce and study two-sided matching with incomplete information and interdependent valuations on one side of the market. An example of such a setting is a matching market between colleges and students in which colleges receive partially informative signals about students. Stability in such markets depends on the amount of information about matchings available to colleges. When colleges observe the entire matching, a stable matching mechanism does not generally exist. When colleges observe only their own matches, a stable mechanism exists if students have identical preferences over colleges, but may not exist if students have different preferences.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)85-105
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume145
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2010

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Two-sided matching
Interdependent values
Stable matching
Matching markets
Interdependent valuations
Incomplete information

Keywords

  • Interdependent values
  • Matching
  • Stability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Two-sided matching with interdependent values. / Chakraborty, Archishman; Citanna, Alessandro; Ostrovsky, Michael.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 145, No. 1, 01.01.2010, p. 85-105.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Chakraborty, Archishman ; Citanna, Alessandro ; Ostrovsky, Michael. / Two-sided matching with interdependent values. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2010 ; Vol. 145, No. 1. pp. 85-105.
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