Twinning, inorganic replacement, and the organism view

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In explicating his version of the Organism View, Eric Olson argues that you begin to exist only after twinning is no longer possible and that you cannot survive a process of inorganic replacement. Assuming the correctness of the Organism View, but pace Olson, I argue in this paper that the Organism View does not require that you believe either proposition. The claim I shall make about twinning helps to advance a debate that currently divides defenders of the Organism View, while the claim I shall make about inorganic replacement will help to put the Organism View on a par with its rival views by allowing it to accommodate a plausible intuition that its rivals can accommodate, namely, the intuition that you can survive a process of inorganic replacement. Both claims, I shall also argue, are important for those who are interested in the identity condition of a human organism, even if they do not hold the view that you are essentially an organism.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)59-72
Number of pages14
JournalRatio
Volume23
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2010

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Inorganic
Organism
Replacement
Rivals
Intuition
Identity Conditions
Defenders
Correctness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Twinning, inorganic replacement, and the organism view. / Liao, S. Matthew.

In: Ratio, Vol. 23, No. 1, 03.2010, p. 59-72.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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