Turf wars

Helios Herrera, Ernesto Reuben, Michael M. Ting

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Turf wars in organizations commonly occur in environments where competition undermines collaboration. We develop a game theoretic model and experimental test of turf wars. The model explores how team production incentives ex post affect team formation decisions ex ante. In the game, one agent decides whether to share jurisdiction over a project with other agents. Agents with jurisdiction decide whether to exert effort and receive a reward based on their relative performance. Hence, sharing can increase joint production but introduces competition for the reward. We find that collaboration has a non-monotonic relationship with both productivity and rewards. The laboratory experiment confirms the model's main predictions.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)143-153
    Number of pages11
    JournalJournal of Public Economics
    Volume152
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Aug 1 2017

    Fingerprint

    Reward
    Jurisdiction
    Team formation
    Team production
    Experimental tests
    Prediction
    Joint production
    Game-theoretic models
    Relative performance
    Laboratory experiments
    Incentives
    Productivity

    Keywords

    • Bureaucracy
    • Competition
    • Information withholding
    • Jurisdiction
    • Organizations
    • Turf war

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Herrera, H., Reuben, E., & Ting, M. M. (2017). Turf wars. Journal of Public Economics, 152, 143-153. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.06.002

    Turf wars. / Herrera, Helios; Reuben, Ernesto; Ting, Michael M.

    In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 152, 01.08.2017, p. 143-153.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Herrera, H, Reuben, E & Ting, MM 2017, 'Turf wars', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 152, pp. 143-153. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.06.002
    Herrera H, Reuben E, Ting MM. Turf wars. Journal of Public Economics. 2017 Aug 1;152:143-153. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.06.002
    Herrera, Helios ; Reuben, Ernesto ; Ting, Michael M. / Turf wars. In: Journal of Public Economics. 2017 ; Vol. 152. pp. 143-153.
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