Turf wars

Helios Herrera, Ernesto Reuben, Michael M. Ting

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Turf wars in organizations commonly occur in environments where competition undermines collaboration. We develop a game theoretic model and experimental test of turf wars. The model explores how team production incentives ex post affect team formation decisions ex ante. In the game, one agent decides whether to share jurisdiction over a project with other agents. Agents with jurisdiction decide whether to exert effort and receive a reward based on their relative performance. Hence, sharing can increase joint production but introduces competition for the reward. We find that collaboration has a non-monotonic relationship with both productivity and rewards. The laboratory experiment confirms the model's main predictions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)143-153
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume152
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1 2017

Fingerprint

Reward
Jurisdiction
Team formation
Experimental tests
Team production
Joint production
Prediction
Game-theoretic models
Laboratory experiments
Relative performance
Productivity
Incentives

Keywords

  • Bureaucracy
  • Competition
  • Information withholding
  • Jurisdiction
  • Organizations
  • Turf war

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Turf wars. / Herrera, Helios; Reuben, Ernesto; Ting, Michael M.

In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 152, 01.08.2017, p. 143-153.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Herrera, Helios ; Reuben, Ernesto ; Ting, Michael M. / Turf wars. In: Journal of Public Economics. 2017 ; Vol. 152. pp. 143-153.
@article{8d6b192228934370b3528096f47e9ac1,
title = "Turf wars",
abstract = "Turf wars in organizations commonly occur in environments where competition undermines collaboration. We develop a game theoretic model and experimental test of turf wars. The model explores how team production incentives ex post affect team formation decisions ex ante. In the game, one agent decides whether to share jurisdiction over a project with other agents. Agents with jurisdiction decide whether to exert effort and receive a reward based on their relative performance. Hence, sharing can increase joint production but introduces competition for the reward. We find that collaboration has a non-monotonic relationship with both productivity and rewards. The laboratory experiment confirms the model's main predictions.",
keywords = "Bureaucracy, Competition, Information withholding, Jurisdiction, Organizations, Turf war",
author = "Helios Herrera and Ernesto Reuben and Ting, {Michael M.}",
year = "2017",
month = "8",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.06.002",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "152",
pages = "143--153",
journal = "Journal of Public Economics",
issn = "0047-2727",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Turf wars

AU - Herrera, Helios

AU - Reuben, Ernesto

AU - Ting, Michael M.

PY - 2017/8/1

Y1 - 2017/8/1

N2 - Turf wars in organizations commonly occur in environments where competition undermines collaboration. We develop a game theoretic model and experimental test of turf wars. The model explores how team production incentives ex post affect team formation decisions ex ante. In the game, one agent decides whether to share jurisdiction over a project with other agents. Agents with jurisdiction decide whether to exert effort and receive a reward based on their relative performance. Hence, sharing can increase joint production but introduces competition for the reward. We find that collaboration has a non-monotonic relationship with both productivity and rewards. The laboratory experiment confirms the model's main predictions.

AB - Turf wars in organizations commonly occur in environments where competition undermines collaboration. We develop a game theoretic model and experimental test of turf wars. The model explores how team production incentives ex post affect team formation decisions ex ante. In the game, one agent decides whether to share jurisdiction over a project with other agents. Agents with jurisdiction decide whether to exert effort and receive a reward based on their relative performance. Hence, sharing can increase joint production but introduces competition for the reward. We find that collaboration has a non-monotonic relationship with both productivity and rewards. The laboratory experiment confirms the model's main predictions.

KW - Bureaucracy

KW - Competition

KW - Information withholding

KW - Jurisdiction

KW - Organizations

KW - Turf war

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85030629286&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85030629286&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.06.002

DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.06.002

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85030629286

VL - 152

SP - 143

EP - 153

JO - Journal of Public Economics

JF - Journal of Public Economics

SN - 0047-2727

ER -