Try again till you are satisfied

Convergence, outcomes and mean-field limits

Alain Tcheukam, Tembine Hamidou

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Abstract

    This article examines the famous distributed algorithm: try-again-till-you're-satisfied in opinion formation game. It illustrates that a simple learning algorithm which consists to react only when unsatisfied through on/off observation can provide a satisfactory solution. Learning takes place during the interactions of the game, in which the agents have no direct knowledge of the payoff model. Each agent is allowed to observe their own satisfaction/dissatisfaction state and has only one-step memory. The existing results linking the outcomes to stationary satisfactory set do not apply to this situation because of continuous action space. We provide a direct proof of convergence of the scheme for arbitrary initial conditions and arbitrary number of agents. As the number of iterations grows, we show that there is an emergence of a consensus in terms of opinion distribution of satisfied agents. A similar result holds for the mean-field opinion formation game.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationProceedings of the 28th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2016
    PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
    Pages2641-2645
    Number of pages5
    ISBN (Electronic)9781467397148
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Aug 3 2016
    Event28th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2016 - Yinchuan, China
    Duration: May 28 2016May 30 2016

    Other

    Other28th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2016
    CountryChina
    CityYinchuan
    Period5/28/165/30/16

    Fingerprint

    Mean-field Limit
    Opinion Formation
    Game
    Stationary Set
    Arbitrary
    Distributed Algorithms
    Parallel algorithms
    Mean Field
    Learning algorithms
    Linking
    Learning Algorithm
    Initial conditions
    Iteration
    Data storage equipment
    Interaction

    Keywords

    • learning algorithm
    • model-free optimization
    • opinion dynamics

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Control and Systems Engineering
    • Control and Optimization
    • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
    • Artificial Intelligence
    • Decision Sciences (miscellaneous)

    Cite this

    Tcheukam, A., & Hamidou, T. (2016). Try again till you are satisfied: Convergence, outcomes and mean-field limits. In Proceedings of the 28th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2016 (pp. 2641-2645). [7531429] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CCDC.2016.7531429

    Try again till you are satisfied : Convergence, outcomes and mean-field limits. / Tcheukam, Alain; Hamidou, Tembine.

    Proceedings of the 28th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. p. 2641-2645 7531429.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Tcheukam, A & Hamidou, T 2016, Try again till you are satisfied: Convergence, outcomes and mean-field limits. in Proceedings of the 28th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2016., 7531429, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 2641-2645, 28th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2016, Yinchuan, China, 5/28/16. https://doi.org/10.1109/CCDC.2016.7531429
    Tcheukam A, Hamidou T. Try again till you are satisfied: Convergence, outcomes and mean-field limits. In Proceedings of the 28th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2016. p. 2641-2645. 7531429 https://doi.org/10.1109/CCDC.2016.7531429
    Tcheukam, Alain ; Hamidou, Tembine. / Try again till you are satisfied : Convergence, outcomes and mean-field limits. Proceedings of the 28th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. pp. 2641-2645
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