TrojanZero: Switching Activity-Aware Design of Undetectable Hardware Trojans with Zero Power and Area Footprint

Imran Hafeez Abbassi, Faiq Khalid, Semeen Rehman, Awais Mehmood Kamboh, Axel Jantsch, Siddharth Garg, Muhammad Shafique

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Conventional Hardware Trojan (HT) detection techniques are based on the validation of integrated circuits to determine changes in their functionality, and on non-invasive side-channel analysis to identify the variations in their physical parameters. In particular, almost all the proposed side-channel power-based detection techniques presume that HTs are detectable because they only add gates to the original circuit with a noticeable increase in power consumption. This paper demonstrates how undetectable HTs can be realized with zero impact on the power and area footprint of the original circuit. Towards this, we propose a novel concept of TrojanZero and a systematic methodology for designing undetectable HTs in the circuits, which conceals their existence by gate-level modifications. The crux is to salvage the cost of the HT from the original circuit without being detected using standard testing techniques. Our methodology leverages the knowledge of transition probabilities of the circuit nodes to identify and safely remove expendable gates, and embeds malicious circuitry at the appropriate locations with zero power and area overheads when compared to the original circuit. We synthesize these designs and then embed in multiple ISCAS85 benchmarks using a 65nm technology library, and perform a comprehensive power and area characterization. Our experimental results demonstrate that the proposed TrojanZero designs are undetectable by the state-of-the-art power-based detection methods.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2019 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2019
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages914-919
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9783981926323
DOIs
StatePublished - May 14 2019
Event22nd Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2019 - Florence, Italy
Duration: Mar 25 2019Mar 29 2019

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 2019 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2019

Conference

Conference22nd Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2019
CountryItaly
CityFlorence
Period3/25/193/29/19

Fingerprint

Hardware
Networks (circuits)
Zero
Side-channel Analysis
Salvaging
Methodology
Integrated Circuits
Transition Probability
Leverage
Demonstrate
Power Consumption
Integrated circuits
Design
Electric power utilization
Benchmark
Testing
Costs
Experimental Results
Vertex of a graph
Hardware security

Keywords

  • Area
  • ATPG
  • Hardware Trojans
  • Power Analysis
  • Signal Probability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
  • Control and Optimization

Cite this

Abbassi, I. H., Khalid, F., Rehman, S., Kamboh, A. M., Jantsch, A., Garg, S., & Shafique, M. (2019). TrojanZero: Switching Activity-Aware Design of Undetectable Hardware Trojans with Zero Power and Area Footprint. In Proceedings of the 2019 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2019 (pp. 914-919). [8714829] (Proceedings of the 2019 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2019). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.23919/DATE.2019.8714829

TrojanZero : Switching Activity-Aware Design of Undetectable Hardware Trojans with Zero Power and Area Footprint. / Abbassi, Imran Hafeez; Khalid, Faiq; Rehman, Semeen; Kamboh, Awais Mehmood; Jantsch, Axel; Garg, Siddharth; Shafique, Muhammad.

Proceedings of the 2019 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2019. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. p. 914-919 8714829 (Proceedings of the 2019 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2019).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abbassi, IH, Khalid, F, Rehman, S, Kamboh, AM, Jantsch, A, Garg, S & Shafique, M 2019, TrojanZero: Switching Activity-Aware Design of Undetectable Hardware Trojans with Zero Power and Area Footprint. in Proceedings of the 2019 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2019., 8714829, Proceedings of the 2019 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2019, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 914-919, 22nd Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2019, Florence, Italy, 3/25/19. https://doi.org/10.23919/DATE.2019.8714829
Abbassi IH, Khalid F, Rehman S, Kamboh AM, Jantsch A, Garg S et al. TrojanZero: Switching Activity-Aware Design of Undetectable Hardware Trojans with Zero Power and Area Footprint. In Proceedings of the 2019 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2019. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2019. p. 914-919. 8714829. (Proceedings of the 2019 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2019). https://doi.org/10.23919/DATE.2019.8714829
Abbassi, Imran Hafeez ; Khalid, Faiq ; Rehman, Semeen ; Kamboh, Awais Mehmood ; Jantsch, Axel ; Garg, Siddharth ; Shafique, Muhammad. / TrojanZero : Switching Activity-Aware Design of Undetectable Hardware Trojans with Zero Power and Area Footprint. Proceedings of the 2019 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2019. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. pp. 914-919 (Proceedings of the 2019 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2019).
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