Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability

James R. Hollyer, Bryan Rosendorff, James Raymond Vreeland

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Democratic rule is maintained so long as all relevant actors in the political system comply with the institutional rules of the game - democratic institutions must be self-enforcing. We examine the role of transparency in supporting a democratic equilibrium. Transparency improves the functioning of elections: in transparent polities, elections more effectively resolve adverse selection problems between the public and their rulers. Transparency increases popular satisfaction with democracy and inhibits challenges to the democratic order. We provide a game-theoretic model, test these claims, and find they enjoy empirical support. Transparency is associated with a reduction in both the probability of democratic collapse and of the irregular removal of democratic leaders. Transparency stabilizes democratic rule.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1251-1277
    Number of pages27
    JournalBritish Journal of Political Science
    DOIs
    StateAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2019

    Fingerprint

    protest
    transparency
    election
    political system
    leader
    democracy

    Keywords

    • democratic consolidation
    • leader removal
    • transparency

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Hollyer, J. R., Rosendorff, B., & Vreeland, J. R. (Accepted/In press). Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability. British Journal of Political Science, 1251-1277. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000308

    Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability. / Hollyer, James R.; Rosendorff, Bryan; Vreeland, James Raymond.

    In: British Journal of Political Science, 01.01.2019, p. 1251-1277.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Hollyer, James R. ; Rosendorff, Bryan ; Vreeland, James Raymond. / Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability. In: British Journal of Political Science. 2019 ; pp. 1251-1277.
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