Toward a Theory of Concept Mastery: The Recognition View

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Agents can think using concepts they do not fully understand. This paper investigates the question “Under what conditions does a thinker fully understand, or have mastery of, a concept?” I lay out a gauntlet of problems and desiderata with which any theory of concept mastery must cope. I use these considerations to argue against three views of concept mastery, according to which mastery is a matter of holding certain beliefs, being disposed to make certain inferences, or having certain intuitions. None of these attitudes is either necessary or sufficient for mastery. I propose and respond to objections to my own recognition view of the conditions under which a thinker has mastery of a concept.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalErkenntnis
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2018

Fingerprint

Layout
Concepts
Mastery
Sufficient
Necessary
Thinkers
Beliefs
Intuition
Inference

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Logic

Cite this

Toward a Theory of Concept Mastery : The Recognition View. / Rabin, Gabriel.

In: Erkenntnis, 01.01.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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