To trust or not

A security signaling game between service provider and client

Monireh Mohebbi Moghaddam, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Quanyan Zhu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the interactions between a service provider (SP) and a client, where the client does not have complete information about the security conditions of the service provider. The environment includes several resources of the service provider, a client who sends requests to the service provider, and the signal generated by the service provider and delivered to the client. By taking into account potential attacks on the service provider, we develop an extended signaling game model, where the prior probability of the signaling game is determined by the outcome of a normal form game between an attacker and the service provider as a defender. Our results show different equilibria of the game as well as conditions under which these equilibria can take place. This will eventually help the defender to select the best defense mechanism against potential attacks, given his knowledge about the type of the attacker.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationDecision and Game Theory for Security - 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, Proceedings
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages322-333
Number of pages12
Volume9406
ISBN (Print)9783319255934
DOIs
StatePublished - 2015
Event6th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2015 - London, United Kingdom
Duration: Nov 4 2015Nov 5 2015

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume9406
ISSN (Print)03029743
ISSN (Electronic)16113349

Other

Other6th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2015
CountryUnited Kingdom
CityLondon
Period11/4/1511/5/15

Fingerprint

Game
Attack
Prior Probability
Normal Form
Resources
Interaction

Keywords

  • Computation outsourcing
  • Game theory
  • Network security
  • Signaling game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Theoretical Computer Science

Cite this

Moghaddam, M. M., Manshaei, M. H., & Zhu, Q. (2015). To trust or not: A security signaling game between service provider and client. In Decision and Game Theory for Security - 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, Proceedings (Vol. 9406, pp. 322-333). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9406). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_18

To trust or not : A security signaling game between service provider and client. / Moghaddam, Monireh Mohebbi; Manshaei, Mohammad Hossein; Zhu, Quanyan.

Decision and Game Theory for Security - 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, Proceedings. Vol. 9406 Springer Verlag, 2015. p. 322-333 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9406).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Moghaddam, MM, Manshaei, MH & Zhu, Q 2015, To trust or not: A security signaling game between service provider and client. in Decision and Game Theory for Security - 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, Proceedings. vol. 9406, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 9406, Springer Verlag, pp. 322-333, 6th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2015, London, United Kingdom, 11/4/15. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_18
Moghaddam MM, Manshaei MH, Zhu Q. To trust or not: A security signaling game between service provider and client. In Decision and Game Theory for Security - 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, Proceedings. Vol. 9406. Springer Verlag. 2015. p. 322-333. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_18
Moghaddam, Monireh Mohebbi ; Manshaei, Mohammad Hossein ; Zhu, Quanyan. / To trust or not : A security signaling game between service provider and client. Decision and Game Theory for Security - 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, Proceedings. Vol. 9406 Springer Verlag, 2015. pp. 322-333 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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