The shadow of the polls

Electoral effects on international agreements

Alastair Smith, David R. Hayes

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Using Putnam's (1988) metaphor of two-level games, we consider the relationship between international agreements and domestic elections. We develop a Reversion Point game to reflect the anarchy of the international system. In this game, deals last only as long as both sides continue to support them. When nations form international agreements, they do so knowing how these agreements affect future renegotiations. Rather than model the electorate as an informal ratifier of agreements, we assume that voters make deliberate choices about which party to elect. Since agreements made prior to an election affect the deals that are renegotiated following an election, today's agreements affect which party the electorate prefer to renegotiate agreements in the future. Thus, agreements affect the outcome of elections. A government's strategy in negotiations is therefore affected by how deals influence future renegotiation and elections. We characterize the circumstances under which elections compel governments to accept agreements that myopically they do not support or reject agreements that are myopically favorable.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)79-108
    Number of pages30
    JournalInternational Interactions
    Volume23
    Issue number1
    StatePublished - 1997

    Fingerprint

    international agreement
    election
    anarchy
    international system
    metaphor

    Keywords

    • International negotiations
    • Two-level games

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Political Science and International Relations

    Cite this

    The shadow of the polls : Electoral effects on international agreements. / Smith, Alastair; Hayes, David R.

    In: International Interactions, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1997, p. 79-108.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Smith, Alastair ; Hayes, David R. / The shadow of the polls : Electoral effects on international agreements. In: International Interactions. 1997 ; Vol. 23, No. 1. pp. 79-108.
    @article{f783732bfac247e0b80d0dcac89aab48,
    title = "The shadow of the polls: Electoral effects on international agreements",
    abstract = "Using Putnam's (1988) metaphor of two-level games, we consider the relationship between international agreements and domestic elections. We develop a Reversion Point game to reflect the anarchy of the international system. In this game, deals last only as long as both sides continue to support them. When nations form international agreements, they do so knowing how these agreements affect future renegotiations. Rather than model the electorate as an informal ratifier of agreements, we assume that voters make deliberate choices about which party to elect. Since agreements made prior to an election affect the deals that are renegotiated following an election, today's agreements affect which party the electorate prefer to renegotiate agreements in the future. Thus, agreements affect the outcome of elections. A government's strategy in negotiations is therefore affected by how deals influence future renegotiation and elections. We characterize the circumstances under which elections compel governments to accept agreements that myopically they do not support or reject agreements that are myopically favorable.",
    keywords = "International negotiations, Two-level games",
    author = "Alastair Smith and Hayes, {David R.}",
    year = "1997",
    language = "English (US)",
    volume = "23",
    pages = "79--108",
    journal = "International Interactions",
    issn = "0305-0629",
    publisher = "Taylor and Francis Ltd.",
    number = "1",

    }

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - The shadow of the polls

    T2 - Electoral effects on international agreements

    AU - Smith, Alastair

    AU - Hayes, David R.

    PY - 1997

    Y1 - 1997

    N2 - Using Putnam's (1988) metaphor of two-level games, we consider the relationship between international agreements and domestic elections. We develop a Reversion Point game to reflect the anarchy of the international system. In this game, deals last only as long as both sides continue to support them. When nations form international agreements, they do so knowing how these agreements affect future renegotiations. Rather than model the electorate as an informal ratifier of agreements, we assume that voters make deliberate choices about which party to elect. Since agreements made prior to an election affect the deals that are renegotiated following an election, today's agreements affect which party the electorate prefer to renegotiate agreements in the future. Thus, agreements affect the outcome of elections. A government's strategy in negotiations is therefore affected by how deals influence future renegotiation and elections. We characterize the circumstances under which elections compel governments to accept agreements that myopically they do not support or reject agreements that are myopically favorable.

    AB - Using Putnam's (1988) metaphor of two-level games, we consider the relationship between international agreements and domestic elections. We develop a Reversion Point game to reflect the anarchy of the international system. In this game, deals last only as long as both sides continue to support them. When nations form international agreements, they do so knowing how these agreements affect future renegotiations. Rather than model the electorate as an informal ratifier of agreements, we assume that voters make deliberate choices about which party to elect. Since agreements made prior to an election affect the deals that are renegotiated following an election, today's agreements affect which party the electorate prefer to renegotiate agreements in the future. Thus, agreements affect the outcome of elections. A government's strategy in negotiations is therefore affected by how deals influence future renegotiation and elections. We characterize the circumstances under which elections compel governments to accept agreements that myopically they do not support or reject agreements that are myopically favorable.

    KW - International negotiations

    KW - Two-level games

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0007029991&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0007029991&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    M3 - Article

    VL - 23

    SP - 79

    EP - 108

    JO - International Interactions

    JF - International Interactions

    SN - 0305-0629

    IS - 1

    ER -