The rule of law in the fight against terrorism

Tiberiu Dragu, Mattias Polborn

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    What is the role of legal limits on executive power, if any, when citizens demand more security from terrorism, and allowing executive officials legal flexibility of action appears necessary to achieve it? We develop a game-theoretic model to show that when the executive faces increased electoral incentives to provide security and has legal flexibility to choose any policy it finds optimal, security from terrorism can actually decrease. In contrast, when the executive faces increased electoral incentives to provide security and there is an explicit legal limit on executive counterterrorism activities, security from terrorism increases. We also show that the executive achieves the objective of terrorism prevention more effectively when there are some limitations on its counterterrorism powers. The article provides a security rationale for legal limits on executive power and has implications for understanding how to design the institutional structure of liberal governments when the social objective is terrorism prevention.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    JournalAmerican Journal of Political Science
    DOIs
    StateAccepted/In press - 2013

    Fingerprint

    fight against terrorism
    constitutional state
    terrorism
    executive power
    flexibility
    incentive
    citizen
    demand

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    The rule of law in the fight against terrorism. / Dragu, Tiberiu; Polborn, Mattias.

    In: American Journal of Political Science, 2013.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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