The role of sales agents in information disclosure: Evidence from a field experiment

Hunt Allcott, Richard L. Sweeney

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    With a large nationwide retailer, we run a natural field experiment to measure the effects of energy use information disclosure, customer rebates, and sales agent incentives on demand for energy-efficient durable goods. Although a combination of large rebates plus sales incentives substantially increases market share, information and sales incentives alone each have zero statistical effect and explain at most a small fraction of the low baseline market share. Sales agents strategically comply only partially with the experiment, targeting information to more interested consumers but not discussing energy efficiency with the disinterested majority. These results suggest that seller-provided information is not a major barrier to energy-efficiency investments at current prices in this context.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)21-39
    Number of pages19
    JournalManagement Science
    Volume63
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2017

    Fingerprint

    Information disclosure
    Field experiment
    Incentives
    Energy efficiency
    Market share
    Rebates
    Energy
    Natural field experiment
    Experiment
    Seller
    Targeting
    Retailers
    Energy use

    Keywords

    • Energy efficiency
    • Energy-using durables
    • Information disclosure
    • Randomized field experiments

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Strategy and Management
    • Management Science and Operations Research

    Cite this

    The role of sales agents in information disclosure : Evidence from a field experiment. / Allcott, Hunt; Sweeney, Richard L.

    In: Management Science, Vol. 63, No. 1, 01.01.2017, p. 21-39.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Allcott, Hunt ; Sweeney, Richard L. / The role of sales agents in information disclosure : Evidence from a field experiment. In: Management Science. 2017 ; Vol. 63, No. 1. pp. 21-39.
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