The role of political ideology in the structural design of new governance agencies

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

Abstract

This paper employs theories of structural politics and delegation to develop a set of propositions about the legislative delegation of authority to quasi-governmental entities, known as "quangos." Legislators have incentives to condition their choice of structure for an organization charged with implementing policy on their own political attitudes toward "good government." The quasi-independence of quangos provides credibility for legislators to commit to a process that takes policy making out of their hands while creating a structure that increases the likelihood of achieving their policy goals. Theoretical implications are empirically examined using data on the financial autonomy of Dutch public bodies. The results support the argument that it is important to consider politicians' ideologies directly in governance studies because they form the key component of structural politics.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)583-595
Number of pages13
JournalPublic Administration Review
Volume66
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2006

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political ideology
governance
politics
political attitude
credibility
Ideologies
politician
autonomy
incentive
organization
Political ideology
Governance
Delegation
Government
Autonomy
Ideology
Policy making
Political attitudes
Authority
Politicians

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Public Administration
  • Marketing

Cite this

The role of political ideology in the structural design of new governance agencies. / Bertelli, Anthony.

In: Public Administration Review, Vol. 66, No. 4, 07.2006, p. 583-595.

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

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