The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness

Bettina Klaus, Olivier Bochet

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem (J Econ Theory 14:412-418, 1977) establishes the equivalence between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness, two cornerstone conditions for the decentralization of social choice rules. We consider a general model that covers public goods economies as in Muller-Satterthwaite (J Econ Theory 14:412-418, 1977) as well as private goods economies. For private goods economies, we use a weaker condition than Maskin monotonicity that we call unilateral monotonicity. We introduce two easy-to-check preference domain conditions which separately guarantee that (i) unilateral/Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness (Theorem 1) and (ii) strategy-proofness implies unilateral/Maskin monotonicity (Theorem 2). We introduce and discuss various classical single-peaked preference domains and show which of the domain conditions they satisfy (see Propositions 1 and 2 and an overview in Table 1). As a by-product of our analysis, we obtain some extensions of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem as summarized in Theorem 3. We also discuss some new "Muller-Satterthwaite preference domains" (e. g., Proposition 3).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)41-63
Number of pages23
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume40
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2013

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economy
equivalence
decentralization
guarantee
Strategy-proofness
Monotonicity
Maskin monotonicity
Social choice rule
Equivalence
Decentralization
Guarantee
Single-peaked preferences

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness. / Klaus, Bettina; Bochet, Olivier.

In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 40, No. 1, 01.01.2013, p. 41-63.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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