Abstract
The problem of apparently irrational beliefs arises when one is confronted with another person who appears to believe what appears puzzling. The first use raises the issue of sincerely asserted belief. When people say puzzling things they could be joking or pretending or mimicking or free-associating or reciting or, in general, performing a wide range of acts while expressing themselves in the propositional language of belief. The problem of apparently irrational beliefs is a problem that raises, in turn, the question of relativism: of whether answering the question of what counts as rational, or non-puzzling, is relative to different perspectives, so that there is a plurality of correct and conflicting answers to it.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Philosophy of Anthropology and Sociology |
| Publisher | Elsevier |
| Pages | 591-606 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780444515421 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2007 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences(all)
Cite this
The problem of apparently irrational beliefs. / Lukes, Steven.
Philosophy of Anthropology and Sociology. Elsevier, 2007. p. 591-606.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter
}
TY - CHAP
T1 - The problem of apparently irrational beliefs
AU - Lukes, Steven
PY - 2007
Y1 - 2007
N2 - The problem of apparently irrational beliefs arises when one is confronted with another person who appears to believe what appears puzzling. The first use raises the issue of sincerely asserted belief. When people say puzzling things they could be joking or pretending or mimicking or free-associating or reciting or, in general, performing a wide range of acts while expressing themselves in the propositional language of belief. The problem of apparently irrational beliefs is a problem that raises, in turn, the question of relativism: of whether answering the question of what counts as rational, or non-puzzling, is relative to different perspectives, so that there is a plurality of correct and conflicting answers to it.
AB - The problem of apparently irrational beliefs arises when one is confronted with another person who appears to believe what appears puzzling. The first use raises the issue of sincerely asserted belief. When people say puzzling things they could be joking or pretending or mimicking or free-associating or reciting or, in general, performing a wide range of acts while expressing themselves in the propositional language of belief. The problem of apparently irrational beliefs is a problem that raises, in turn, the question of relativism: of whether answering the question of what counts as rational, or non-puzzling, is relative to different perspectives, so that there is a plurality of correct and conflicting answers to it.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84860136455&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/B978-044451542-1/50018-0
DO - 10.1016/B978-044451542-1/50018-0
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:84860136455
SN - 9780444515421
SP - 591
EP - 606
BT - Philosophy of Anthropology and Sociology
PB - Elsevier
ER -