The probability of condorcet cycles and super majority rules

Yves Balasko, Hervé Crès

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Majority voting aggregates individual preference profiles into a binary relation on the set of alternatives. Condorcet cycles are cycles of the aggregated binary relation. We show that the relative volume of the subset of the (n!-1)-simplex that represents profile distributions such that the aggregated preferences display Condorcet cycles is a decreasing function of the super majority levelτbounded by the expressionn!1-τ0.4714n!.This expression shows that Condorcet cycles become rare events for super majority rules larger than 53%.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D71.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)237-270
Number of pages34
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume75
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1 1997

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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