The political economy of municipal transfers

Evidence from Mexico

Jeffrey Timmons, Daniel Broidy

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    How do fiscal institutions, partisanship, and governance affect federal transfers to municipalities? We address this question using a novel research design and data set for Mexico.We compare the state-level obligations for federal transfers to municipalities with the distribution of these funds as reported by municipalities. This strategy allows us to know whether state-level formulas are binding, whether there are partisan skews in the formula, and how and why governors reallocate funds.We find that state-level fiscal institutions are quite binding; even so, deviations from the formula total approximately US$300-500 million annually. Whereas Partido Revolucionario Institucional governors appear to reallocate to municipalities when they are governed by their co-partisans, Partido Acción Nacional and Partido de la Revolución Democrática governors appear to reallocate funds to municipalities for equity, stabilization, and disasters (with no detectable partisan bias).

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)551-579
    Number of pages29
    JournalPublius
    Volume43
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Sep 1 2013

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    municipality
    political economy
    Mexico
    evidence
    stabilization
    research planning
    obligation
    disaster
    equity
    governance
    trend

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Public Administration

    Cite this

    The political economy of municipal transfers : Evidence from Mexico. / Timmons, Jeffrey; Broidy, Daniel.

    In: Publius, Vol. 43, No. 4, 01.09.2013, p. 551-579.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Timmons, Jeffrey ; Broidy, Daniel. / The political economy of municipal transfers : Evidence from Mexico. In: Publius. 2013 ; Vol. 43, No. 4. pp. 551-579.
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