The neuroscience of moral cognition: From dual processes to dynamic systems

Jay Van Bavel, Oriel FeldmanHall, Peter Mende-Siedlecki

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Prominent theories of morality have integrated philosophy with psychology and biology. Although this approach has been highly generative, we argue that it does not fully capture the rich and dynamic nature of moral cognition. We review research from the dual-process tradition, in which moral intuitions are automatically elicited and reasoning is subsequently deployed to correct these initial intuitions. We then describe how the computations underlying moral cognition are diverse and widely distributed throughout the brain. Finally, we illustrate how social context modulates these computations, recruiting different systems for real (vs. hypothetical) moral judgments, examining the dynamic process by which moral judgments are updated. In sum, we advocate for a shift from dual-process to dynamic system models of moral cognition.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number154
Pages (from-to)167-172
Number of pages6
JournalCurrent Opinion in Psychology
Volume6
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2015

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Neurosciences
Cognition
Intuition
Psychology
Brain
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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Psychology(all)

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The neuroscience of moral cognition : From dual processes to dynamic systems. / Van Bavel, Jay; FeldmanHall, Oriel; Mende-Siedlecki, Peter.

In: Current Opinion in Psychology, Vol. 6, 154, 01.12.2015, p. 167-172.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Van Bavel, Jay ; FeldmanHall, Oriel ; Mende-Siedlecki, Peter. / The neuroscience of moral cognition : From dual processes to dynamic systems. In: Current Opinion in Psychology. 2015 ; Vol. 6. pp. 167-172.
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