The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency

David Pearce, Ennio Stacchetti

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    In a repeated principal-agent model in which the agent's actions are observable to the principal but not verifiable in court, the agent's incentives derive both from salary payments based on verifiable signals and from implicit promises by the principal of bonuses for good behavior. Explicit short-term contracts are designed to enhance the effectiveness of the infinite-horizon implicit contract between principal and agent. In a constrained-efficient equilibrium, bonuses smooth the consumption path of the risk-averse agent by moving in the opposite direction from salaries, total consumption, and expected discounted utility for the rest of the game.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C7, C73, D8.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)75-96
    Number of pages22
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume23
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Apr 1998

    Fingerprint

    Interaction
    Bonuses
    Salary
    Risk-averse
    Implicit contracts
    Incentives
    Principal-agent model
    Payment
    Economics
    Discounted utility
    Infinite horizon

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Finance

    Cite this

    The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency. / Pearce, David; Stacchetti, Ennio.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 23, No. 1, 04.1998, p. 75-96.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Pearce, David ; Stacchetti, Ennio. / The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 1998 ; Vol. 23, No. 1. pp. 75-96.
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