The impact of elections on cooperation: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in Uganda

Guy Grossman, Delia Baldassarri

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

    Abstract

    This chapter analyzes the effectiveness of internal centralized-sanctioning institutions in fostering cooperation. It demonstrates that the political process by which an authority originally acquires its sanctioning powers is consequential for cooperation. To investigate these aspects, "lab-in-the-field" behavioral experiments, in the chapter, are combined with observational data on 1541 producers from 50 Ugandan farmer associations. To study the impact of internal centralized-sanctioning authorities, the chapter compares the cooperative behavior of subjects who do not face a threat of punishment to that of subjects in a context where a monitor is granted monopoly over sanctioning powers. To study whether the political process through which local authorities acquire their powers is consequential, the chapter compares the cooperative behavior of subjects who elected their monitor with the behavior of subjects who were assigned a monitor selected at random. The chapter focuses on testing whether elections have a positive impact on subjects' cooperative behavior.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationAnalytical Sociology: Actions and Networks
    PublisherWiley Blackwell
    Pages196-232
    Number of pages37
    ISBN (Electronic)9781118762707
    ISBN (Print)9781119940388
    DOIs
    StatePublished - May 5 2014

    Fingerprint

    Uganda
    cooperative behavior
    election
    experiment
    evidence
    farmer's association
    monopoly
    penalty
    producer
    threat

    Keywords

    • Analytical sociology
    • Cooperation
    • Cooperative behavior
    • Elections
    • Lab-in-the-field experiment
    • Uganda

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Social Sciences(all)

    Cite this

    Grossman, G., & Baldassarri, D. (2014). The impact of elections on cooperation: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in Uganda. In Analytical Sociology: Actions and Networks (pp. 196-232). Wiley Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118762707.ch08

    The impact of elections on cooperation : Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in Uganda. / Grossman, Guy; Baldassarri, Delia.

    Analytical Sociology: Actions and Networks. Wiley Blackwell, 2014. p. 196-232.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

    Grossman, G & Baldassarri, D 2014, The impact of elections on cooperation: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in Uganda. in Analytical Sociology: Actions and Networks. Wiley Blackwell, pp. 196-232. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118762707.ch08
    Grossman G, Baldassarri D. The impact of elections on cooperation: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in Uganda. In Analytical Sociology: Actions and Networks. Wiley Blackwell. 2014. p. 196-232 https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118762707.ch08
    Grossman, Guy ; Baldassarri, Delia. / The impact of elections on cooperation : Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in Uganda. Analytical Sociology: Actions and Networks. Wiley Blackwell, 2014. pp. 196-232
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