The Effects of Precedent on Arbitration

Andrew Schotter

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This paper presents a new view of the arbitration process in which the arbitrator is depicted as a random device to generate arbitration decisions. The conflicting parties must decide whether to send their dispute to the arbitrator, based on their subjective probability beliefs concerning the arbitration’s outcome. If their beliefs are “sufficiently divergent,” we can expect both to agree to arbitration. As similar disputes are arbitrated and precedent is set, however, these divergent beliefs can be expected to vanish. Using some game theoretical results of Aumann and Rosenthal, we demonstrate that such convergence will ruin the incentive to arbitrate for conflicts that are zero (or constant) sum in nature, and for games that are non-constant sum but “best responsive equivalent” to zero sum games. It will not do so in general for conflicts that are non-zero sum. We then examine the welfare implications of these results and point out a paradox that arises in this context.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)659-678
    Number of pages20
    JournalJournal of Conflict Resolution
    Volume22
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 1978

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    arbitration
    welfare
    incentive
    Arbitration
    Dispute

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations

    Cite this

    The Effects of Precedent on Arbitration. / Schotter, Andrew.

    In: Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1978, p. 659-678.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Schotter, Andrew. / The Effects of Precedent on Arbitration. In: Journal of Conflict Resolution. 1978 ; Vol. 22, No. 4. pp. 659-678.
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