The effect of selective INS monitoring strategies on the industrial employment choice and earnings of recent immigrants

Alberto Dávila, Jose Pagan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

One effect of 1986's immigration reform was to make INS inspection of farms more costly relative to other industries. In response, we suggest, the INS refocused its enforcement efforts toward industries with a higher concentration of illegals per establishment, especially manufacturing. We test this hypotheses and model the effects of a selective monitoring strategy on the employment choice and wages of illegal workers. We find evidence of selective monitoring by the INS and that this policy has redistributed illegal workers from closely to weakly monitored industries. Specifically, we find a shift from the higher-paying manufacturing sector to the agricultural.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)138-150
Number of pages13
JournalEconomic Inquiry
Volume35
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1997

Fingerprint

Immigrants
Monitoring
Industry
Workers
Immigration
Farm
Enforcement
Hypothesis test
Wages
Manufacturing
Manufacturing sector
Inspection

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

The effect of selective INS monitoring strategies on the industrial employment choice and earnings of recent immigrants. / Dávila, Alberto; Pagan, Jose.

In: Economic Inquiry, Vol. 35, No. 1, 1997, p. 138-150.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{86a7544a4f864ee8a8f2b2558d9bf188,
title = "The effect of selective INS monitoring strategies on the industrial employment choice and earnings of recent immigrants",
abstract = "One effect of 1986's immigration reform was to make INS inspection of farms more costly relative to other industries. In response, we suggest, the INS refocused its enforcement efforts toward industries with a higher concentration of illegals per establishment, especially manufacturing. We test this hypotheses and model the effects of a selective monitoring strategy on the employment choice and wages of illegal workers. We find evidence of selective monitoring by the INS and that this policy has redistributed illegal workers from closely to weakly monitored industries. Specifically, we find a shift from the higher-paying manufacturing sector to the agricultural.",
author = "Alberto D{\'a}vila and Jose Pagan",
year = "1997",
doi = "10.1111/j.1465-7295.1997.tb01900.x",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "35",
pages = "138--150",
journal = "Economic Inquiry",
issn = "0095-2583",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The effect of selective INS monitoring strategies on the industrial employment choice and earnings of recent immigrants

AU - Dávila, Alberto

AU - Pagan, Jose

PY - 1997

Y1 - 1997

N2 - One effect of 1986's immigration reform was to make INS inspection of farms more costly relative to other industries. In response, we suggest, the INS refocused its enforcement efforts toward industries with a higher concentration of illegals per establishment, especially manufacturing. We test this hypotheses and model the effects of a selective monitoring strategy on the employment choice and wages of illegal workers. We find evidence of selective monitoring by the INS and that this policy has redistributed illegal workers from closely to weakly monitored industries. Specifically, we find a shift from the higher-paying manufacturing sector to the agricultural.

AB - One effect of 1986's immigration reform was to make INS inspection of farms more costly relative to other industries. In response, we suggest, the INS refocused its enforcement efforts toward industries with a higher concentration of illegals per establishment, especially manufacturing. We test this hypotheses and model the effects of a selective monitoring strategy on the employment choice and wages of illegal workers. We find evidence of selective monitoring by the INS and that this policy has redistributed illegal workers from closely to weakly monitored industries. Specifically, we find a shift from the higher-paying manufacturing sector to the agricultural.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0040652166&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0040652166&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1997.tb01900.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1997.tb01900.x

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0040652166

VL - 35

SP - 138

EP - 150

JO - Economic Inquiry

JF - Economic Inquiry

SN - 0095-2583

IS - 1

ER -