The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting

Rebecca B. Morton, Marco Piovesan, Jean Robert Tyran

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a “dark side,” that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters is biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. However, in the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective and does not sufficiently de-bias voters.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)461-481
    Number of pages21
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume113
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 2019

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    Keywords

    • Cognitive biases
    • Information aggregation
    • Social information
    • Voting
    • Wisdom of crowds

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

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