The conscription of wealth

Mass warfare and the demand for progressive taxation

Kenneth Scheve, David Stasavage

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The dominant narrative of the politics of redistribution in political science and economics highlights the signature role of the rise of electoral democracy and the development of political parties that mobilize working-class groups. We argue in this article that this narrative ignores the critical role played by mass warfare in the development of redistributive public policies. Focusing attention on the determinants of progressive taxation, we argue that mobilization for mass warfare led to demands for increased taxation of the wealthy to more fairly distribute the burden for the war effort. We then show empirically that during the past century, mass mobilization for war has been associated with a notable increase in tax progressivity. In the absence of war, neither the establishment of universal suffrage, nor the arrival of political control by parties of the left is systematically associated with large increases in tax progressivity. In making these arguments, we devote particular attention to a "difference-in-differences" comparison of participants and nonparticipants in World War I.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)529-561
Number of pages33
JournalInternational Organization
Volume64
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2010

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warfare
taxation
taxes
mobilization
demand
narrative
suffrage
political control
First World War
redistribution
working class
political science
public policy
determinants
democracy
politics
economics
Conscription
Warfare
Wealth

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Political Science and International Relations
  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
  • Law

Cite this

The conscription of wealth : Mass warfare and the demand for progressive taxation. / Scheve, Kenneth; Stasavage, David.

In: International Organization, Vol. 64, No. 4, 09.2010, p. 529-561.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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