The clarity of the majority’s preference moderates the influence of lobbying on representation

Joan Barcelo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Delegate conceptions of representation require activities of legislators to reflect their constituents’ preferences. Recent research has examined the distortionary effects of lobbying activities on this representational linkage. Here, I argue that the effect of interest groups on legislators’ behavior depends on the clarity of the majority’s preferences in a district. When the electorate is narrowly divided, Members of Parliament (MPs) may choose to reap the benefits associated with interest groups as costs from defection are lowest. The results show that MP defection from constituents’ preferences is only positively associated with sectional interest group ties when the constituency is narrowly divided on an issue. Likewise, MP defection is only negatively associated with an MP’s ties to cause groups when the constituency is narrowly divided on an issue. These results are important because they specify the conditions under which interest group lobbying is sufficient to override constituents’ preferences.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)349-357
Number of pages9
JournalParty Politics
Volume25
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2019

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Keywords

  • interest groups
  • lobbying
  • representation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

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The clarity of the majority’s preference moderates the influence of lobbying on representation. / Barcelo, Joan.

In: Party Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3, 01.05.2019, p. 349-357.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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