The administrative foundation of the rule of law

Tiberiu Dragu, Mattias Polborn

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This article builds upon the observation that political rulers have to rely upon administrators to implement their policy decisions to uncover two mechanisms by which legal limits, understood in terms of fundamental human rights, can be self-enforcing. We show how the effectiveness of such legal limits depends on administrators' expectation that rights violations might be costly in the future, when the current ruler's grip on power ends. We also show how the effectiveness of legal limits depends on administrators' expectation about each others' actions when asked to execute an illegal policy, which allows for the possibility that human rights laws might induce compliance by making a particular behavior salient. The analysis contributes to a general understanding of the mechanisms by which law can effectively limit the arbitrary power of the government.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1038-1050
    Number of pages13
    JournalJournal of Politics
    Volume75
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Oct 2013

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    constitutional state
    human rights
    Law

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    The administrative foundation of the rule of law. / Dragu, Tiberiu; Polborn, Mattias.

    In: Journal of Politics, Vol. 75, No. 4, 10.2013, p. 1038-1050.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Dragu, Tiberiu ; Polborn, Mattias. / The administrative foundation of the rule of law. In: Journal of Politics. 2013 ; Vol. 75, No. 4. pp. 1038-1050.
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