Testing the Trustworthiness of IC Testing: An Oracle-Less Attack on IC Camouflaging

Muhammad Yasin, Ozgur Sinanoglu, Jeyavijayan Rajendran

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Test of integrated circuits (ICs) is essential to ensure their quality; the test is meant to prevent defective and out-of-spec ICs from entering into the supply chain. The test is conducted by comparing the observed IC output with the expected test responses for a set of test patterns; the test patterns are generated using automatic test pattern generation algorithms. Existing test-pattern generation algorithms aim to achieve higher fault coverage at lower test costs. In an attempt to reduce the size of test data, these algorithms reveal the maximum information about the internal circuit structure. This is realized through sensitizing the internal nets to the outputs as much as possible, unintentionally leaking the secrets embedded in the circuit as well. In this paper, we present HackTest, an attack that extracts secret information generated in the test data, even if the test data do not explicitly contain the secret. HackTest can break the existing intellectual property protection techniques, such as camouflaging, within 2 min for our benchmarks using only the camouflaged layout and the test data. HackTest applies to all existing camouflaged gate-selection techniques and is successful even in the presence of the state-of-The-Art test infrastructure, i.e., test data compression circuits. Our attack necessitates that the IC test data generation algorithms can be reinforced with security.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number7937844
Pages (from-to)2668-2682
Number of pages15
JournalIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Volume12
Issue number11
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 2017

Fingerprint

Integrated circuit testing
Integrated circuits
Testing
Networks (circuits)
Automatic test pattern generation
Intellectual property
Data compression
Supply chains
Costs

Keywords

  • hardware security
  • IC camouflaging
  • IP piracy
  • reverse engineering
  • VLSI testing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

Testing the Trustworthiness of IC Testing : An Oracle-Less Attack on IC Camouflaging. / Yasin, Muhammad; Sinanoglu, Ozgur; Rajendran, Jeyavijayan.

In: IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, Vol. 12, No. 11, 7937844, 01.11.2017, p. 2668-2682.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{bbed97f2acbb46289a6e749981a64a75,
title = "Testing the Trustworthiness of IC Testing: An Oracle-Less Attack on IC Camouflaging",
abstract = "Test of integrated circuits (ICs) is essential to ensure their quality; the test is meant to prevent defective and out-of-spec ICs from entering into the supply chain. The test is conducted by comparing the observed IC output with the expected test responses for a set of test patterns; the test patterns are generated using automatic test pattern generation algorithms. Existing test-pattern generation algorithms aim to achieve higher fault coverage at lower test costs. In an attempt to reduce the size of test data, these algorithms reveal the maximum information about the internal circuit structure. This is realized through sensitizing the internal nets to the outputs as much as possible, unintentionally leaking the secrets embedded in the circuit as well. In this paper, we present HackTest, an attack that extracts secret information generated in the test data, even if the test data do not explicitly contain the secret. HackTest can break the existing intellectual property protection techniques, such as camouflaging, within 2 min for our benchmarks using only the camouflaged layout and the test data. HackTest applies to all existing camouflaged gate-selection techniques and is successful even in the presence of the state-of-The-Art test infrastructure, i.e., test data compression circuits. Our attack necessitates that the IC test data generation algorithms can be reinforced with security.",
keywords = "hardware security, IC camouflaging, IP piracy, reverse engineering, VLSI testing",
author = "Muhammad Yasin and Ozgur Sinanoglu and Jeyavijayan Rajendran",
year = "2017",
month = "11",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1109/TIFS.2017.2710954",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "12",
pages = "2668--2682",
journal = "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security",
issn = "1556-6013",
publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",
number = "11",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Testing the Trustworthiness of IC Testing

T2 - An Oracle-Less Attack on IC Camouflaging

AU - Yasin, Muhammad

AU - Sinanoglu, Ozgur

AU - Rajendran, Jeyavijayan

PY - 2017/11/1

Y1 - 2017/11/1

N2 - Test of integrated circuits (ICs) is essential to ensure their quality; the test is meant to prevent defective and out-of-spec ICs from entering into the supply chain. The test is conducted by comparing the observed IC output with the expected test responses for a set of test patterns; the test patterns are generated using automatic test pattern generation algorithms. Existing test-pattern generation algorithms aim to achieve higher fault coverage at lower test costs. In an attempt to reduce the size of test data, these algorithms reveal the maximum information about the internal circuit structure. This is realized through sensitizing the internal nets to the outputs as much as possible, unintentionally leaking the secrets embedded in the circuit as well. In this paper, we present HackTest, an attack that extracts secret information generated in the test data, even if the test data do not explicitly contain the secret. HackTest can break the existing intellectual property protection techniques, such as camouflaging, within 2 min for our benchmarks using only the camouflaged layout and the test data. HackTest applies to all existing camouflaged gate-selection techniques and is successful even in the presence of the state-of-The-Art test infrastructure, i.e., test data compression circuits. Our attack necessitates that the IC test data generation algorithms can be reinforced with security.

AB - Test of integrated circuits (ICs) is essential to ensure their quality; the test is meant to prevent defective and out-of-spec ICs from entering into the supply chain. The test is conducted by comparing the observed IC output with the expected test responses for a set of test patterns; the test patterns are generated using automatic test pattern generation algorithms. Existing test-pattern generation algorithms aim to achieve higher fault coverage at lower test costs. In an attempt to reduce the size of test data, these algorithms reveal the maximum information about the internal circuit structure. This is realized through sensitizing the internal nets to the outputs as much as possible, unintentionally leaking the secrets embedded in the circuit as well. In this paper, we present HackTest, an attack that extracts secret information generated in the test data, even if the test data do not explicitly contain the secret. HackTest can break the existing intellectual property protection techniques, such as camouflaging, within 2 min for our benchmarks using only the camouflaged layout and the test data. HackTest applies to all existing camouflaged gate-selection techniques and is successful even in the presence of the state-of-The-Art test infrastructure, i.e., test data compression circuits. Our attack necessitates that the IC test data generation algorithms can be reinforced with security.

KW - hardware security

KW - IC camouflaging

KW - IP piracy

KW - reverse engineering

KW - VLSI testing

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85029423877&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85029423877&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/TIFS.2017.2710954

DO - 10.1109/TIFS.2017.2710954

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85029423877

VL - 12

SP - 2668

EP - 2682

JO - IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

JF - IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

SN - 1556-6013

IS - 11

M1 - 7937844

ER -