Test-mode-only scan attack using the boundary scan chain

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Boundary-scan is a very popular technology with wide applications in product life cycle that ranges from product design, prototype debugging, production to field service. However, when it comes to securing a product such as smart card, RFID tag, set-top-box, etc., the technology can be targeted by an attacker to reveal the secret information of the chip. In this paper, for the first time, we will show that the boundary scan chain can be used to bypass the mode-reset countermeasure, which is used to thwart all the scan attacks that rely on switching between the normal mode and the test mode of the chip. We propose two attacks on the AES core. The first attack uses the boundary scan chain to apply input plaintexts to the first round of AES, whereas the second attack targets the final round by applying the inputs through the internal scan chain(s) and the round output is captured in the boundary scan chain. The attacks not only bypass the mode-reset countermeasure but also circumvent the affect of stimulus decompressor (first attack) or the response compactor (second attack). Both attacks retrieve the 128-bit secret key within one minute of execution.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2014 19th IEEE European Test Symposium, ETS 2014
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
ISBN (Print)9781479934157
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014
Event19th IEEE European Test Symposium, ETS 2014 - Paderborn, Germany
Duration: May 26 2014May 30 2014

Other

Other19th IEEE European Test Symposium, ETS 2014
CountryGermany
CityPaderborn
Period5/26/145/30/14

Fingerprint

Set-top boxes
Smart cards
Product design
Radio frequency identification (RFID)
Life cycle

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

Cite this

Ali, S. S., Sinanoglu, O., & Karri, R. (2014). Test-mode-only scan attack using the boundary scan chain. In Proceedings - 2014 19th IEEE European Test Symposium, ETS 2014 [6847798] IEEE Computer Society. https://doi.org/10.1109/ETS.2014.6847798

Test-mode-only scan attack using the boundary scan chain. / Ali, Sk Subidh; Sinanoglu, Ozgur; Karri, Ramesh.

Proceedings - 2014 19th IEEE European Test Symposium, ETS 2014. IEEE Computer Society, 2014. 6847798.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Ali, SS, Sinanoglu, O & Karri, R 2014, Test-mode-only scan attack using the boundary scan chain. in Proceedings - 2014 19th IEEE European Test Symposium, ETS 2014., 6847798, IEEE Computer Society, 19th IEEE European Test Symposium, ETS 2014, Paderborn, Germany, 5/26/14. https://doi.org/10.1109/ETS.2014.6847798
Ali SS, Sinanoglu O, Karri R. Test-mode-only scan attack using the boundary scan chain. In Proceedings - 2014 19th IEEE European Test Symposium, ETS 2014. IEEE Computer Society. 2014. 6847798 https://doi.org/10.1109/ETS.2014.6847798
Ali, Sk Subidh ; Sinanoglu, Ozgur ; Karri, Ramesh. / Test-mode-only scan attack using the boundary scan chain. Proceedings - 2014 19th IEEE European Test Symposium, ETS 2014. IEEE Computer Society, 2014.
@inproceedings{46c94d4fc00644dab036f244d587adca,
title = "Test-mode-only scan attack using the boundary scan chain",
abstract = "Boundary-scan is a very popular technology with wide applications in product life cycle that ranges from product design, prototype debugging, production to field service. However, when it comes to securing a product such as smart card, RFID tag, set-top-box, etc., the technology can be targeted by an attacker to reveal the secret information of the chip. In this paper, for the first time, we will show that the boundary scan chain can be used to bypass the mode-reset countermeasure, which is used to thwart all the scan attacks that rely on switching between the normal mode and the test mode of the chip. We propose two attacks on the AES core. The first attack uses the boundary scan chain to apply input plaintexts to the first round of AES, whereas the second attack targets the final round by applying the inputs through the internal scan chain(s) and the round output is captured in the boundary scan chain. The attacks not only bypass the mode-reset countermeasure but also circumvent the affect of stimulus decompressor (first attack) or the response compactor (second attack). Both attacks retrieve the 128-bit secret key within one minute of execution.",
author = "Ali, {Sk Subidh} and Ozgur Sinanoglu and Ramesh Karri",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1109/ETS.2014.6847798",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9781479934157",
booktitle = "Proceedings - 2014 19th IEEE European Test Symposium, ETS 2014",
publisher = "IEEE Computer Society",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Test-mode-only scan attack using the boundary scan chain

AU - Ali, Sk Subidh

AU - Sinanoglu, Ozgur

AU - Karri, Ramesh

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - Boundary-scan is a very popular technology with wide applications in product life cycle that ranges from product design, prototype debugging, production to field service. However, when it comes to securing a product such as smart card, RFID tag, set-top-box, etc., the technology can be targeted by an attacker to reveal the secret information of the chip. In this paper, for the first time, we will show that the boundary scan chain can be used to bypass the mode-reset countermeasure, which is used to thwart all the scan attacks that rely on switching between the normal mode and the test mode of the chip. We propose two attacks on the AES core. The first attack uses the boundary scan chain to apply input plaintexts to the first round of AES, whereas the second attack targets the final round by applying the inputs through the internal scan chain(s) and the round output is captured in the boundary scan chain. The attacks not only bypass the mode-reset countermeasure but also circumvent the affect of stimulus decompressor (first attack) or the response compactor (second attack). Both attacks retrieve the 128-bit secret key within one minute of execution.

AB - Boundary-scan is a very popular technology with wide applications in product life cycle that ranges from product design, prototype debugging, production to field service. However, when it comes to securing a product such as smart card, RFID tag, set-top-box, etc., the technology can be targeted by an attacker to reveal the secret information of the chip. In this paper, for the first time, we will show that the boundary scan chain can be used to bypass the mode-reset countermeasure, which is used to thwart all the scan attacks that rely on switching between the normal mode and the test mode of the chip. We propose two attacks on the AES core. The first attack uses the boundary scan chain to apply input plaintexts to the first round of AES, whereas the second attack targets the final round by applying the inputs through the internal scan chain(s) and the round output is captured in the boundary scan chain. The attacks not only bypass the mode-reset countermeasure but also circumvent the affect of stimulus decompressor (first attack) or the response compactor (second attack). Both attacks retrieve the 128-bit secret key within one minute of execution.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84904480328&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84904480328&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/ETS.2014.6847798

DO - 10.1109/ETS.2014.6847798

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 9781479934157

BT - Proceedings - 2014 19th IEEE European Test Symposium, ETS 2014

PB - IEEE Computer Society

ER -