Taxation and representation in recent history

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper disaggregates government accounts to examine whether and how representation affects the level and distribution of taxation. Using panel data for over 100 countries from 1970 to 1999 and cross-sectional data for approximately 75 democracies from 1990 to 1998, we find that both democratization and voter turnout induced a modest but highly systematic increase in revenue from regressive taxes on consumption. While one-third of the increase due to democratization reflects a shift from more inefficient and similarly regressive taxes on trade, most of it was new revenue. Less convincingly, democratization and voter turnout also increased total tax revenue. By contrast, neither democracy, nor voter turnout systematically increased revenue from progressive taxes on income and capital. With reasonable assumptions about tax incidence and participation patterns, these findings shed light on competing conceptions of taxation and representation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)191-208
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Politics
Volume72
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2010

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voter turnout
taxation
democratization
taxes
revenue
tax incidence
history
democracy
tax revenue
income
participation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Taxation and representation in recent history. / Timmons, Jeffrey.

In: Journal of Politics, Vol. 72, No. 1, 01.01.2010, p. 191-208.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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