Taxation and credible commitment left, right, and partisan turnover

Jeffrey Timmons

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Taxation is partly a game of credible commitment. Data for eighteen OECD countries show that partisan turnover systematically affects the long-run equilibrium mix of taxes and services. When partisan turnover is low, more right-wing influence permanently increases corporate tax revenue and the corporate share of pre-tax income; more left-wing influence, by contrast, permanently increases consumption tax revenue and social spending. When turnover is high, even powerful partisans do not increase taxes that disproportionately affect their supporters. When partisans tax their own supporters, they raise more revenue, even when we account for some plausible benefits. The theoretical conjectures are consistent with the pattern of partisan behavior within countries, not just between them.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)207-227
    Number of pages21
    JournalComparative Politics
    Volume42
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2010

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    taxation
    turnover
    tax revenue
    commitment
    corporate tax
    tax increase
    income tax
    taxes
    OECD
    revenue

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Taxation and credible commitment left, right, and partisan turnover. / Timmons, Jeffrey.

    In: Comparative Politics, Vol. 42, No. 2, 01.01.2010, p. 207-227.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Timmons, Jeffrey. / Taxation and credible commitment left, right, and partisan turnover. In: Comparative Politics. 2010 ; Vol. 42, No. 2. pp. 207-227.
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