Taxation and credible commitment left, right, and partisan turnover

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Taxation is partly a game of credible commitment. Data for eighteen OECD countries show that partisan turnover systematically affects the long-run equilibrium mix of taxes and services. When partisan turnover is low, more right-wing influence permanently increases corporate tax revenue and the corporate share of pre-tax income; more left-wing influence, by contrast, permanently increases consumption tax revenue and social spending. When turnover is high, even powerful partisans do not increase taxes that disproportionately affect their supporters. When partisans tax their own supporters, they raise more revenue, even when we account for some plausible benefits. The theoretical conjectures are consistent with the pattern of partisan behavior within countries, not just between them.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)207-227
Number of pages21
JournalComparative Politics
Volume42
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2010

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taxation
turnover
tax revenue
commitment
corporate tax
tax increase
income tax
taxes
OECD
revenue

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Taxation and credible commitment left, right, and partisan turnover. / Timmons, Jeffrey.

In: Comparative Politics, Vol. 42, No. 2, 01.01.2010, p. 207-227.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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