Synthesis of Tamper-Resistant Pin-Constrained Digital Microfluidic Biochips

Jack Tang, Mohamed Ibrahim, Krishnendu Chakrabarty, Ramesh Karri

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Digital microfluidic biochips (DMFBs) are an emerging technology that implements bioassays through manipulation of discrete fluid droplets. Recent results have shown that DMFBs are vulnerable to actuation tampering attacks, where a malicious adversary modifies control signals for the purposes of manipulating results or causing Denial-of-Service. Such attacks leverage the highly programmable nature of DMFBs. However, practical DMFBs often employ a technique called pin mapping to reduce control pin count while simultaneously reducing the degrees of freedom available for droplet manipulation. Attempts to control specific electrodes as part of an attack cannot be made without inadvertently actuating other electrodes on-chip, which makes the tampering evident. This paper explores this tamper resistance property of pin mapping in detail. We derive relevant security metrics, evaluate the tamper resistance of several existing pin mapping algorithms, and propose a new security-aware pin mapper. Further, we develop ILP-based methodologies for inserting indicator droplets into a DMFB in order to boost tamper resistance. Experimental results show that the proposed techniques can significantly increase the difficulty for an attacker to make stealthy changes to the execution of a bioassay.

Fingerprint

Digital microfluidics
Biochips
Bioassay
Inductive logic programming (ILP)
Electrodes
Degrees of freedom (mechanics)
Fluids

Keywords

  • Digital microfluidics
  • electrode addressing
  • Electrodes
  • ILP.
  • Immune system
  • indicator droplets
  • Measurement
  • Pins
  • Security
  • security
  • System-on-chip
  • tamper resistance

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Synthesis of Tamper-Resistant Pin-Constrained Digital Microfluidic Biochips. / Tang, Jack; Ibrahim, Mohamed; Chakrabarty, Krishnendu; Karri, Ramesh.

In: IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems, 01.01.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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