Synthesis, logical forms, and the objects of our ordinary experience response to Michael Friedman

Beatrice Longuenesse

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

Abstract

In the 82/2 (2000) issue of this journal, Michael Friedman has offered a stimulating discussion of my recent book, Kant and the Capacity to Judge. His conclusion is that on the whole I fail to do justice to what is most revolutionary about Kant's natural philosophy, and instead end up attributing to Kant a pre-Newtonian, Aristotelian philosophy of nature. This is because, according to Friedman, I put excessive weight on Kant's claim to have derived his categories from a set of logical forms of judgment which he inherits from a traditional Aristotelian logic. In taking Kant at his word on this point, I fail to give their full import to Kant's insights into the newly discovered applications of mathematical concepts and methods to the science of nature.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)199-212
Number of pages14
JournalArchiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie
Volume83
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1 2001

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Immanuel Kant
Logical Form
Michael Friedman
Aristotelian
Import
Revolution
Natural philosophy
Aristotelian philosophy
Justice
Philosophy of Nature
Logic
Nature

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Synthesis, logical forms, and the objects of our ordinary experience response to Michael Friedman. / Longuenesse, Beatrice.

In: Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 83, No. 2, 01.08.2001, p. 199-212.

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

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