Suicide terrorism and the backlash effect

Bryan Rosendorff, Todd Sandler

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This paper presents a game-theoretic model of suicide terrorism containing three agents: the terrorist leader; a targeted government; and potential terrorist supporters. Supporters join the terrorist group if they gain more from their participation than from their economic opportunities. Preemptive measures by the government can result in a backlash that encourages recruitment through new grievances. Suicide attacks can also lead to recruitment. Increases in preemption costs and/or economic opportunities can reduce the overall level of terrorism, while increasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks. An increase in the effect of preemption on recruitment, or the propaganda effect of suicide bombings has the opposite effect of increasing normal and suicide attacks, but decreasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks in the terrorist organization's strategy profile.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)443-457
    Number of pages15
    JournalDefence and Peace Economics
    Volume21
    Issue number5
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Oct 2010

    Fingerprint

    suicide
    terrorism
    propaganda
    economics
    Suicide terrorism
    Suicide
    Attack
    leader
    participation
    costs
    Government
    Economics
    Proportion
    Preemption
    Group

    Keywords

    • Backlash
    • Game theory
    • Mobilization
    • Preemption
    • Recruitment
    • Suicide terrorism
    • Terrorism

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

    Cite this

    Suicide terrorism and the backlash effect. / Rosendorff, Bryan; Sandler, Todd.

    In: Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 21, No. 5, 10.2010, p. 443-457.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Rosendorff, Bryan ; Sandler, Todd. / Suicide terrorism and the backlash effect. In: Defence and Peace Economics. 2010 ; Vol. 21, No. 5. pp. 443-457.
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